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ABSTRACT
 This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first essay, Short Sales in the NYSE Batch 
Open and NASDAQ Opening Cross, examines opening-trade short volume’s relation to short 
volume for the rest of the trading day and to overnight, previous-day, and same-day price 
changes.  We find that short volume in the batch open and opening cross increases with short 
volume for the rest of the day, with previous-day, open-to-close price changes, and with 
overnight price changes for S&P 500 stocks.  Batch-open short volume increases with overnight 
price changes, and it increases (does not decrease) for firms making positive (negative) overnight 
earnings announcements.  Opening-cross short volume increases with close-to-close, previous-
day price changes and is negatively related to same-day price changes. 
 Our second essay, Short Sales around Open-Market Repurchase Announcements, studies 
short selling of a firm’s stock during the five days after it announces an open-market repurchase.  
We conclude that a firm may be able to mislead normally-informed investors about its quality by 
announcing an open-market repurchase.  Next, we conclude that open-market repurchase size 
does not possess positive signaling attributes.  Lastly, we conclude that short sellers do not 
predict the repurchasing behavior of firms announcing an open-market repurchase. 
 The third essay, Profit Efficiency and Big Bank Presence in Rural Markets, studies the 
effect of big-bank presence on the profitability of rural one-market banks.  We find that a small 
rural bank shows decreased profit efficiency and increased return on assets due to higher loan 
income when it competes with at least one big bank.  If multiple big banks are competing with a 
small rural bank, the small bank shows a smaller decrease in profit efficiency and a smaller 
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increase in return on assets due to a smaller increase in loan income than if it competes with one 
big bank.  From these results, we conclude that big banks choose to remain in rural markets 
where they possess some degree of market power, enabling them to earn higher returns while 
operating less efficiently, but market power is restricted when more than one big bank is present 
in a rural market.
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ESSAY I: SHORT SALES IN THE NYSE BATCH OPEN AND NASDAQ OPENING CROSS 
 
 
 This paper looks at short sale volume that occurs as part of the batch open on the NYSE 
and as part of the opening cross on NASDAQ.  The primary purpose of our study is to determine 
if short selling that occurs in a stock during these opening trades is predictive of short sale 
volume in that stock during the rest of the trading day and to determine whether short sales 
volume for a stock in the batch open or opening cross is related to its overnight price change or 
its previous day price change.  We also examine how short sales that execute in the batch open 
and opening cross relate to price changes over the remainder of the trading day.  We conduct this 
study to add to knowledge about daily-level short sales (e.g. Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009, and 
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004) by examining short sales during the concentrated volume 
and high uncertainty of the market open (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000).  We are also 
motivated as trading at the open is considered crucial (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000) and 
informative (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003).  For the remainder of the paper, opening trade 
refers to the batch open on the NYSE and/or the opening cross on NASDAQ, and opening price 
refers to the price set by the NYSE specialist for the batch open and/or the price set by 
NASDAQ’s electronic opening cross. 
The opening price in a stock reflects both public and private information that has 
accumulated during the overnight period (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003).  We examine whether 
short sales volume occurring in the opening trade is predictive of short sales volume over the rest 
of the day because total opening trade volume is positively related to total volume for the 
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remainder of the day (Brooks and Moulton, 2004).  Further, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) 
conclude that short sales are contrarian in contemporaneous returns and predictive of future 
negative returns.  In our context of short sales in the opening trade, we consider overnight price 
changes (previous close to opening trade) and previous day price changes (close to close and 
open to close on the previous day) to correspond to contemporaneous returns,  and we consider 
intraday price changes (opening trade to close) to correspond to future returns.  Therefore, we 
suggest that opening trade short sales increase in overnight and previous day price changes and 
that opening trade short volume is inversely related to intraday price changes.1  
We also examine short selling in the opening trade that follows a stock’s earnings release 
made after the previous close but before the opening trade.  We refer to these releases as non-
trading period (NTP) earnings announcements.  Barclay and Hendershott (2003) suggest 
earnings announcements made during this time frame will likely induce larger price reversals 
than earnings announcements made when markets are open due to lower price-discovery 
efficiency during the overnight period.  Therefore, informed short sellers may attempt to profit 
on these reversals.  Since Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers are contrarian in 
contemporaneous returns, we believe that short volume may increase (decrease) in a stock’s 
opening trade that follows an NTP earnings announcement with a positive (negative) surprise.   
Blau and Pinegar (2010) show that daily short sales spike the day of and the day after 
positive earnings announcements.  We differ from Blau and Pinegar (2010) since we do not look 
at daily short selling but focus on opening trade short sales, and we do not study their relation to 
                                                            
1 We recognize the potential endogeneity issue with stating that short volume in the opening trade is related to 
overnight price change that is calculated using the opening price since any short sales in the opening trade affect the 
opening price. However, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) find that only 9% of price discovery from the previous 
close to the open occurs in the opening trade.  So we suggest that any concerns should be small since very little price 
discovery for the overnight price change is determined by sales of any type in the opening trade. 
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all earnings announcements but only those made during the previous non-trading period.2  For 
completeness, we study both positive and negative NTP announcements, but we focus on 
positive NTP announcements because they are more likely to affect the opening trade on the next 
day (Brooks, Patel, and Su, 2003).  If short volume increases in the opening trade following 
positive NTP earnings announcements, it may add to the findings of Blau and Pinegar (2010) by 
indicating that increased short selling following positive earnings announcements begins as soon 
as short sellers have the opportunity to act during the trading day.3  
Lastly, we study short sales of S&P 500 stocks during the opening trade on option-
expiration Fridays.  Stoll and Whaley (1991) find that S&P 500 stocks experience significant 
price reversals around the opening price when expiration values for S&P 500 option contracts are 
determined by the opening price of the component stocks on expiration Fridays.  In light of these 
reversals around the opening price for S&P 500 stocks, the evidence that short sellers are 
contrarian in contemporaneous returns and that short sales predict negative returns (Diether, Lee, 
and Werner, 2009) leads us to examine whether opening trade short volume increases on option-
expiration Fridays for S&P 500 stocks whose opening price is higher than the previous close.  
This study’s primary contribution is in determining how short sale volume during the 
market’s opening trade is related to the day’s short sale volume following the opening trade and 
in examining how short sale volume during the opening trade is related to overnight, previous 
day, and intraday price changes.  We also examine short selling in the batch open and opening 
cross on two specific trading-day types.  For days following non-trading period earnings 
                                                            
2To underscore the importance of studying the opening trade on days following non-trading period earnings 
announcements, we highlight that the practice of firms making after-hours earnings announcements is becoming 
common place.  Berkman and Truong (2009) report earnings are announced after-hours more than 40% of the time 
for Russell 3000 index stocks over the period 2000-2004.  The Russell 3000 index represents 98% of the United 
States equity market as it includes the 3,000 largest stocks according to market-cap. 
3 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) show that when large numbers of informed traders are active around an 
informational event, all of their information is revealed quickly as they aggressively and rapidly trade for profit 
around the event. 
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releases, we explore whether short selling during the opening trade is related to earnings 
surprises made known in the announcement, and for option-expiration Fridays, we look at the 
relation of opening-trade short volume to overnight price changes in S&P 500 stocks which, on 
average, demonstrate price reversals around the opening trade on option-expiration Fridays. 
5 
 
I. HYPOTHESES
 
 Our first hypothesis considers the relation between opening-trade short volume and short 
volume over the remainder of the day.  Barclay and Hendershott (2003) indicate that the opening 
trade is an informative trade, and Brooks and Moulton (2004) find that opening trade volume and 
total volume for the day are positively related.  Based on these findings, we suggest that short 
volume in the opening trade is positively related to short volume over the remainder of the same 
day and question whether short selling during the opening trade for a stock is predictive of the 
level of short selling in that stock for the rest of the day.  We state the following hypothesis: 
H1: A stock’s short volume in the NYSE batch open (NASDAQ opening cross) is positively 
related to that stock’s short volume over the remainder of the trading day.  
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers are contrarian in contemporaneous 
returns and that their increased activity precedes negative returns across trading days. However, 
they do not focus on the relation between daily returns and short sales executing in the day’s 
opening trade.  We believe the opening is a time when short sellers should be active since 
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short sellers are opportunistic risk bearers, active in 
periods of uncertainty caused by information asymmetry and because the opening trade occurs in 
an atmosphere of uncertainty (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000) and asymmetric information 
(Barclay and Hendershott, 2003).   
Short sellers whose activity increases in positive returns and whose trades successfully 
predict negative returns across days (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009) may also be able to do the 
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same within a trading day.  The opening trade of the day is an attractive time for testing this 
possibility because it is an informative trade (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003) and because we 
can examine short sales in the NYSE batch open and the NASDAQ opening cross as they relate 
to overnight, previous day, and intraday price changes.   
First, we examine short volume in the opening trade and price changes occurring 
overnight and on the previous day.  When the opening price is higher than the previous close, 
there is more buy pressure than sell pressure during the opening trade.  Diether, Lee, and Werner 
(2009) find evidence that short sellers step in to voluntarily provide liquidity when there is 
increased buy pressure.  Therefore, we expect short volume in the opening trade to increase 
when the opening price is higher than the previous close.  Since market participants can gather 
information during the pre-opening period (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003) and informed traders 
use market-on-open orders (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000), we suggest that short sellers 
who are informed (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987, and Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and 
Sloan, 2001) will likely submit market-on-open orders in response to pre-open indications that 
the opening price will be higher than the previous close.4  Their decisions may also be related to 
the previous day’s price changes as short sellers attempt to profit from short-term price 
movements (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009).  We examine whether opening-trade short volume 
increases when the opening price is higher than the previous close and when previous day price 
movements are positive, and state the hypothesis as follows: 
                                                            
4 There may be concerns since short sales in the opening trade impact the opening price, but we think that any bias is 
against our suggested relation.  We believe that short sales increase during the opening trade when pre-open 
indications are that the opening price will be higher, and since short sales push prices downward (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1987), not upward, our results concerning the relation between opening-trade short sale volume and the 
opening price should be interpreted considering the opening price would be higher if short sales that are part of the 
opening trade are not included. 
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H2: A stock’s short volume in the NYSE batch open (NADSAQ opening cross) increases when 
the stock’s opening price is higher than the previous close price (when previous day price 
changes are positive). 
  Next, we turn to the relation between short sales occurring as part of the opening trade 
and the intraday price change occurring from the opening trade to the close on the same day.  
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) show that short sales are informed trades, correctly predicting 
negative returns across days.  The opening price is an informative price because it is based on 
accumulated public and private information (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003), some of which has 
been provided as informed short sellers impact the opening price by submitting market-on-open 
orders (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000).  Therefore, an increase in opening trade short 
volume could effectively predict negative intraday returns.  We examine whether there is a 
negative relation between short volume in the opening trade and intraday price changes.  We 
believe that any endogeneity inherent in testing our hypothesis is limited since price discovery 
occurs over the entire trading day (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003) so that trades occurring after 
the opening trade also contribute to intraday price changes.  Our hypothesis follows:       
H3: There is a negative relation between a stock’s short volume in the NYSE batch open 
(NASDAQ opening cross) and that stock’s intraday price change. 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) suggest earnings announcements made after the market 
closes will likely induce larger price reversals than earnings announcements made during the day 
because price changes when markets are closed are less informative than during normal trading.  
Their findings suggest that a non-trading period (NTP) earnings announcement that reveals a 
surprise may result in overreaction that will be corrected during the following day’s trades.   
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According to Brooks, Patel, and Su (2003) surprise news from an overnight 
announcement results in an immediate price reaction in the following opening trade, and Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (1992) indicate that informed traders will aggressively and rapidly trade 
around information events in order to profit from their information.  During the pre-open period, 
market participants have the opportunity to gather information from indications of the day’s 
opening price (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003), so orders submitted to execute in the NYSE 
batch open or the NASDAQ opening cross are a prime opportunity for short sellers, who have 
superior information (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004), to trade (not trade) if they see an 
indication of prices overreacting to a positive (negative) NTP earnings announcement.  
Therefore, a positive (negative), non-trading period, earnings surprise may be accompanied by 
an increase (decrease) in opening-trade short sales for the stock, particularly if short sellers 
attempt to profit from an expected price reversal after a positive surprise from an NTP earnings 
announcement.        
Blau and Pinegar (2010) find that short sellers are profitable when increasing daily short 
sales in response to positive earnings announcements.  We look at opening trade short sales on 
days following positive and negative NTP earnings announcements to determine whether short 
volume during the opening trade is related to earnings surprises occurring in the non-trading 
period.  We state the following hypothesis:                                                                                  
H4: A stock’s short volume in the NYSE batch open or NASDAQ opening cross increases 
(decreases) with a positive (negative) surprise revealed in that stock’s non-trading period 
earnings announcement that precedes the opening trade.  
Option-expiration-day trading effects are documented by Stoll and Whaley (1990) who 
conclude that price changes on option-expiration days are likely due to non-informational trades, 
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particularly program trading.  Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2008) show that program trading 
on option-expiration days is a cause of increased buy-order pressure in the opening trade of some 
S&P 500 stocks and that this increased pressure results in temporary price changes.  Stoll and 
Whaley (1991) find that on option-expiration Fridays, S&P 500 index stocks experience 
significant price reversals around the opening price.  These price reversals may be due to the 
temporary price changes induced by expiration-day liquidity shocks documented by Barclay, 
Hendershott, and Jones (2008). 
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) conclude that short sellers provide liquidity during 
periods of increased buy pressure and that informed short sellers target short-term overreaction 
in prices in order to profit from subsequent price declines.  Based on these findings, we suggest 
that informed short sellers will increase short volume to provide liquidity for S&P 500 stocks 
with increased buy-order pressure during the opening trade on option-expiration days.  Short 
sellers may trade as they predict that price increases will experience reversal during the trading 
day, allowing them to profit.  Accordingly, for S&P 500 stocks, we examine whether short 
volume in the opening trade on option-expiration Fridays is related to price movements 
occurring during the period between Thursday’s close and the opening trade on Friday.  The 
hypothesis follows:  
H5: On option-expiration Fridays, short volume in the NYSE batch open (NASDAQ opening 
cross) increases in overnight price changes for S&P 500 stocks. 
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II. DATA
 
 We begin our sample formation by identifying ordinary common stocks that are listed on 
the NYSE or NASDAQ.  We select stocks having a share code of 10 or 11 (ordinary, common 
shares) and having an exchange code of 1 or 3 (NYSE and NASDAQ firms, respectively) from 
the CRSP database.  Then, by using TAQ, we restrict the selected NYSE and NASDAQ stocks 
to those that have at least one trade occurring before 10:30 AM EST on everyday of our sample 
period of January, 2005, to December, 2006.  Our study focuses on short sales in the opening 
trade, so we think it necessary to restrict sample stocks to those having their first trade occur near 
the market’s official open time of 9:30 AM EST.  Lastly, we follow the convention of requiring a 
minimum share price for sample stocks (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009) by limiting our 
sample to those stocks having a CRSP opening or closing price of at least $5 on each sample 
day.  Our selection method yields a sample of 1,072 NYSE firms and 688 NASDAQ firms.  We 
test our hypotheses separately for the NYSE batch open and the NASDAQ opening cross as we 
examine short sale volume occurring as part of the opening trade.5 
For each stock in our sample, we use the TAQ database to identify the first recorded trade 
occurring at or after 9:30 AM EST each day as the daily batch open or opening cross trade.  We 
match the TAQ opening trade for each stock on each day to trades in the Regulation SHO short 
sales data by date and time.  If a short sale occurs on the same date at the same time as the batch 
open or opening cross trade identified in the TAQ database, we consider the short sale to be 
                                                            
5 Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2008) conclude that the NYSE batch open and the NASDAQ opening cross, 
started in 2004, function similarly in their price-setting ability.  
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traded in the opening trade of the day.6  For each stock on each day, we calculate a normalized 
opening-trade short volume.  Our normalized measure is calculated by dividing each stock-day, 
opening trade short volume by the mean daily opening trade short volume for the stock as 
measured over all sample days.  Other daily observations taken from CRSP for each sample 
stock include: total volume, opening volume, common shares outstanding, and return. 
We calculate several other variables for each sample stock.  These include daily short 
volume, obtained by summing all shorted shares over each sample day; daily volume not in the 
batch open (opening cross) or intraday volume, which is daily volume less batch open (opening 
cross) volume; daily short volume not in the batch open (opening cross) or intraday short 
volume, which we calculate as daily short volume less short volume in the batch open (opening 
cross); overnight price change, the batch open (opening cross) price minus the previous day’s 
close price; intraday price change, the close price minus the batch open (opening cross) price; the 
abnormal daily return, the CRSP daily return less the CRSP equally-weighted return for the day; 
and firm size, the CRSP shares outstanding value multiplied by the CRSP close price for the day.   
Table 1 and Table 2 show summary statistics for our NYSE and NASDAQ samples, 
respectively.7  We find short sales contribute 17% of daily volume on the NYSE and about 18% 
on NASDAQ over our entire sample, which is quantitatively similar to samples in other studies.8  
We focus on short sales during the opening trade, so we separate daily volume into opening trade 
volume and intraday volume.  Intraday volume has roughly the same proportion of short selling 
as total volume with approximately 17% on the NYSE and 18% on NASDAQ.  The batch open 
                                                            
6 The data sometimes contains two trades that match date and time for a stock’s TAQ opening trade because exempt 
and non-exempt short sales are reported in separate records.  When this occurs, we sum the short sale volume for 
both records so that we account for all short sales that execute in the opening trade of the day. 
7 All Tables for Essay I are provided in the appendix to Essay I. 
8 Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that short volume makes up 24% and 31% of total daily volume on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ, respectively; Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2009) show that short sales, on average, make 
up slightly less than 20% of share volume; and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) find short sales making up about 
13% of volume on the NYSE SuperDOT system.   
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on the NYSE shows approximately 19% short volume; however, short sales make up 29% of the 
opening cross on NASDAQ.   
The opening trade normally occurs quickly after the official market open time of 9:30 
AM EST as the mean time for the batch open is 9:32 AM, and the mean time for the electronic 
opening cross is only ten seconds after trading opens.  The first short sale normally occurs very 
close to 9:30 AM and only slightly later than the opening trade as we find the first short sale 
occurring at about 9:33 AM on both markets.  Prices remain relatively flat during our sample 
period, both during the day and between days.  The mean close price on the NYSE is equal to the 
mean batch open price of $37.97, and the mean opening cross and close prices on NASDAQ are 
separated by only two cents.  The average abnormal daily return over our sample period is only 
one basis point on the NYSE and less than one basis point (+0.00%) on NASDAQ. 
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III. METHODS
 
In testing the first three hypotheses, we are interested in the relation between a stock’s 
short volume in the day’s opening trade and five other measures for the stock: 1) intraday short 
sales, denoted as ISS and defined as daily short volume less short volume in the opening trade; 2) 
overnight price change, denoted as OvernightChg and defined as the opening price minus the 
previous close price; 3) our first measure of the previous day’s price change, denoted as 
PrevCloClo and defined as the close price lagged one day minus the close price lagged two days; 
4) a second measure of the previous day’s price change, denoted as PrevOpenClo and defined as 
the previous day’s close price minus the previous day’s opening price; and 5) intraday price 
change, denoted as IntradayChg and defined as the close price minus the opening price.   
We begin our tests by dividing all stock-day observations into groups based on the 
normalized value of each stock’s opening trade short volume on each trading day.  We call this 
measure the stock’s normal opening short volume and denote it as NOSVi,t.  NOSVi,t is calculated 
as the opening trade short volume for stock i on day t, divided by stock i’s mean opening trade 
short volume over all sample trading days.  Group 1 contains observations with NOSVi,t >= 2, 
indicating stock days when the opening-trade short volume is at least twice the normal amount.  
Group 2 observations are those where 1 <= NOSVi,t < 2, indicating the opening-trade short 
volume is at least the normal amount but less than twice the normal amount.  Group 3 and Group 
4 observations are those having 0.5 <= NOSVi,t < 1 and 0.0 < NOSVi,t < 0.5, respectively.  
Therefore, Group 3 observations have at least half the normal level but less than the normal 
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amount of short sales in the opening trade; and Group 4 observations have some short selling in 
the opening trade but less than half the normal amount.  Group 5 observations are those with no 
short sales in the opening trade, so NOSVi,t = 0.  Observations for a stock may appear in different 
groups since the groups are based on the normal opening short volume for each stock-day 
observation. 
For each of these groups, we calculate mean levels of ISS, OvernightChg, PrevCloClo, 
PrevOpenClo, and IntradayChg.  To determine whether there is a relation between levels of 
short selling in the opening trade and each of these measures, we perform t-tests for difference in 
means between the groups for each measure. 
Next, we use regression analysis by estimating the following two OLS models: 
NOSVi,t = α + β1ISS i,t + β2SSi,t-1 + β3AbReti,t-1 + β4ln(Size)i,t    (1)  
+ γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
 
NOSVi,t = α + β1PriceChangei,t + β2SSi,t-1 + β3AbReti,t-1 + β4ln(Size)i,t    (2) 
 + γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
In both models, the subscript i,t denotes values for the ith stock on the tth trading day of 
the sample.  The dependent variable NOSVi,t is the normalized value of short volume in the 
opening trade for stock i on day t.  In model 1, ISSi,t is intraday short volume for the ith stock on 
the sample’s tth day, which is the independent variable of interest in testing the first hypothesis.  
In model 2, PriceChangei,t is the independent variable of interest when testing the second and 
third hypotheses. For Hypothesis 2, PriceChangei,t is either OverightChgi,t, PrevCloCloi,t, or 
PrevOpenCloi,t.  For testing Hypothesis 3, we use IntradayChgi,t as PriceChangei,t.  
In both models, we include several control variables related to short selling based on 
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009).  First, SSi,t-1 is defined as total short volume for the stock on 
the previous trading day that is scaled by 10,000 (for reporting).  We include SSi,t-1 because short 
15 
 
sales on a given day are correlated with those on the previous day.  Next, AbReti,t-1 is the stock’s 
abnormal daily return for the previous day, where AbReti,t is the CRSP daily return for stock i on 
day t less the CRSP equally-weighted return for day t.  We control for each stock’s previous 
day’s return because short sales increase (decrease) following positive (negative) returns.  
Ln(Size)i,t is the natural log of stock i’s market cap on day t, calculated using the CRSP close 
price  and outstanding common shares for the firm.  The firm size measure is included because 
larger stocks are relatively easier to sell short.   
In models 1 and 2, we include a matrix, W, containing five dummy variables.  Each of 
these dummy variables corresponds to a day of the week and is equal to one if trading day t 
occurs on the corresponding day of the week and zero otherwise.  Similarly, Z is a matrix of four 
dummy variables, corresponding to whether day t is a day when a macroeconomic announcement 
is made at 8:30 AM, is a day when a macroeconomic announcement is made at 10:30 AM, is the 
last trading day for a month, or is the last trading day for a quarter.  We restrict the estimated 
coefficients of the matrix W variables so that they must sum to zero.  Suits (1984) explains that 
restricting the estimation in this way allows us to interpret the unrestricted coefficient estimates 
within the model as averages over all days of the week, so that we avoid using an omitted day of 
the week, causing problematic interpretations by using the omitted day of the week as the base 
case for comparison. 
Hypothesis 4 concerns a stock’s opening trade short volume on days following non-
trading period (NTP) earnings announcements, defined as a firm’s normally scheduled earnings 
announcement that is announced outside of normal trading hours.  The first opportunity for 
information in an NTP announcement to affect prices during normal trading hours is the next 
opening trade.  Therefore, following Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), we consider the 
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trading day that begins with the opening trade after an NTP announcement to be the 
announcement day. 
For tests of Hypothesis 4, we only use sample observations of firms for which we have 
data on all eight, normal, quarterly earnings releases during our two-year sample period.  This 
requirement eliminates 4 NYSE firms and 5 NASDAQ firms, resulting in a restricted sample of 
1,068 NYSE firms and 683 NASDAQ firms.  For these firms, we obtain actual announcements 
and consensus estimates for quarterly earnings using IBES.  We define a positive (negative) 
earnings announcement as one where actual earnings are greater than (less than) the consensus 
estimate for the announcement.  In our restricted sample, 671 of 683 NASDAQ firms and 1,062 
of 1,068 NYSE firms make at least one of eight earnings releases when trading is not open.  
There are 13,418 observations of stock earnings announcements with a total of 12,070 
observations being NTP announcements.  Therefore, it appears that during our sample period, 
firms prefer making earnings announcements during the non-trading period.  Of the NTP 
announcements, 8,152 contain positive surprises, 3,656 contain negative surprises, and 262 
announcements contain no surprise.   
We use the following four OLS models as we test Hypothesis 4: 
NOSVi,t = α + β1AnnDayi,t + β2NTPAnni,t + β3SSi,t-1     (3)  
+ β4AbReti,t-1 + β5ln(Size)i,t  +  γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
 
NOSVi,t = α + β1NTPAnni,t + β2Suri,t + β3NTPAnn*Suri,t     (4) 
+ β4SSi,t-1 + β5AbReti,t-1 + β6ln(Size)i,t  +  γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
 
NOSVi,t = α + β1NTPPosi,t + β2NTPNegi,t + β3NTPPos*Suri,t    (5) 
+ β4NTPNeg*Suri,t + β5SSi,t-1 + β6AbReti,t-1 + β7ln(Size)i,t   
+  γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
 
NOSVi,t = α + β1NTPAnni,t + β2Suri,t + β3NTPPosi,t      (6) 
+ β4NTPNegi,t + β5NTPPos*Suri,t + β6NTPNeg*Suri,t  
+ β7SSi,t-1 + β8AbReti,t-1 + β9ln(Size)i,t  +  γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t 
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The dependent variable, NOSVi,t, is our normalized measure of short volume in the opening trade 
used in models 1 and 2.  Model 3 is estimated using all sample days whereas models 4, 5, and 6 
are estimated using only a sample stock’s earnings announcement days.  Independent variables in 
the models include Suri,t, which is the surprise associated with stock i’s announcement on day t 
and also include a series of dummy variables indicating trading day characteristics by the 
appropriate variable equaling one when the characteristic exists for the day and zero otherwise. 
The dummy variables include AnnDayi,t, denoting if day t is an earnings announcement day for 
stock i; NTPAnni,t, indicating if day t is one when stock i’s earnings announcement was made 
during the non-trading period preceding day t; NTPPosi,t, marking whether an NTP 
announcement for stock i on day t is a positive surprise; and NTPNegi,t, denoting when an NTP 
announcement for stock i on day t contains a negative surprise.  We also include interaction 
variables for variable Suri,t with NTP announcement variables NTPAnni,t, NTPPosi,t, and 
NTPNegi,t.  The other variables in these models are controls as defined previously, and we 
continue to restrict estimated coefficients for day-of-week variables to sum to zero.  
 Hypothesis 5 examines whether there is a relation between NOSV and overnight price 
changes for S&P 500 stocks on option-expiration days.  Therefore, we restrict the sample to only 
those firms that are part of the S&P 500 composite index over the entire sample period of 
January, 2005, to December, 2006.  The resulting sample contains all observations from the main 
sample for the 367 firms that meet this requirement.  We also include daily observations 
(obtained from DeltaNeutral.com) for total open interest and the put-call ratio for each of the 367 
firms in the restricted sample.  Because of the small number of restricted sample firms, we 
assume that S&P 500 stocks are similar regardless of trading market and do not separate the 
sample into NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  We estimate the following OLS model: 
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NOSVi,t = α + β1OEt + β2ON_Chgi,t + β3Revi,t + β4P/Ci,t    (7) 
+ β5OIi,t + β6OE*ON_Chgi,t + β7OE*Revi,t + β8OE*P/Ci,t     
+ β9OE*OIi,t + β10SSi,t-1 + β11AbReti,t-1 + β12ln(Size)i,t  
+  γW  +  δZ   +   εi,t  
  
 In model 7, NOSVi,t continues to be our dependent variable, measuring the normalized 
value of short volume in the opening trade.  Independent variables in model 7 include the 
following: OEi,t , equaling one when trading day t is an option-expiration Friday and zero 
otherwise; ON_Chgi,t , the overnight price change for stock i on day t as defined in model 2; 
P/Ci,t , the put option volume divided by the call option volume for stock i on day t; and OIi,t , the 
total open interest of option contracts for stock i on day t.  We include P/Ci,t and OIi,t to control 
for short sales in the opening trade that are related to option trading in the stock because Diether, 
Lee, and Werner (2009) show that put options trading for a stock are positively correlated with 
short selling in that stock.  Additionally, Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that traded options 
provide completeness for a stock’s market, facilitating short selling in that stock.   
Stoll and Whaley (1991) show that S&P 500 stocks experience price reversals around the 
opening trade on option-expiration Fridays.  In order to test whether short sellers attempt to trade 
on these known reversals, we include Revi,t in model 7 as their calculation of stock i’s price 
movement around the opening trade on day t.  As in Stoll and Whaley (1991), we begin 
calculating two different values of Revi,t using the following:    
preRi,t = [(openPi,t  -  closePi,t) / closePi,t ] x 100       (8) 
postRi,t = [(open+30Pi,t  -  openPi,t) / openPi,t ] x 100      (9) 
postRi,t = [(closePi,t  -  openPi,t) / openPi,t ] x 100       (10) 
 In models 8, 9, and 10, open+30Pi,t is the first price for stock i occurring at or after 10:00 
AM EST (i.e., 30 minutes after market opening); openPi,t is the opening price for stock i on day t; 
and closePi,t  is the closing price of stock i on day t.  Therefore, preRi,t is the return on stock i 
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measured from the previous closing price to the opening price on day t, and postRi,t is the return 
for stock i occurring between the opening trade and either 30 minutes after the market opens or 
market closing on trading day t.  Accordingly, Revi,t has two different values for each stock-day 
observation depending on whether the post-opening-trade return is calculated using the stock’s 
closing price or the stock’s price 30 minutes after the market opens.  Revi,t  is valued according to 
the following rules: 
 Revi,t = postRi,t  when preRi,t < 0        (11) 
Revi,t =  (-1) X postRi,t  when preRi,t > 0       (12) 
A positive (negative) reversal is one where postRi,t  and  preRi,t  have opposite (the same) signs.       
 Other variables in model 7 include interaction terms for OEi,t with ON_Chgi,t, Revi,t, 
P/Ci,t, and OIi,t so that we can estimate the effect of these independent variables on option-
expiration Fridays.  We also include the two matrices, W and Z, containing control variables for 
day of week and trading day type, respectively, as described earlier.  Model 7 is estimated using 
the Suits (1984) procedure of restricting the coefficients for day-of-week variables to sum to 
zero, as in our previous models. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 show five groups of stock-day observations, divided according to 
each observation’s level of normalized short selling in the opening trade, NOSVi,t.  In these 
tables, we present each group’s mean values for each of our tested variables, and we show p-
values for difference in the means between groups.  We find support for our first and second 
hypotheses for NYSE stocks (Table 3).  Our results suggest a positive, monotonic relation 
between batch open short sales and both intraday short selling and overnight price changes.  
Each group with successively higher levels of normalized batch open short volume also has 
significantly higher levels of intraday short sales and overnight price changes than the group with 
a lower level of opening trade short sales.  However, our findings do not support the second part 
of Hypothesis 2, as we find no relation between previous day price changes and batch open short 
sales.  Further, we do not find support for short sales in the batch open being negatively related 
to intraday price changes, as stated in Hypothesis 3. 
When we view NASDAQ results in Table 4, we see limited support, at best, for a positive 
relation between opening cross short sale volume and intraday short sales, overnight price 
changes, or previous day price changes.  However, for NASDAQ stocks,  the results support a 
negative relation between opening-cross short sales and intraday price changes, as in our third 
hypothesis.   
Table 5 shows regression results for tests of the first three hypotheses using our NYSE 
sample.  We find support for Hypothesis 1, as batch open short volume is positively related to 
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short selling over the remainder of the day when we control for other factors likely to affect the 
dependent variable.    Hypothesis 2 is also supported as we find that batch open short volume is 
positively related to overnight price changes and price changes measured between the previous 
day’s open and close.  No support is found for Hypothesis 2 concerning the previous day close-
to-close price change.  Lastly, our results are opposite than expected for Hypothesis 3.  We 
expect a negative relation between opening trade short sales and intraday price changes, but we 
find a positive relation.  
For NASDAQ stocks, regression results support all of our first three hypotheses.  Table 6 
shows that there is a positive relation between opening cross short sales for a stock and short 
sales in that stock over the remainder of the day.  Short sales also increase in the opening cross 
when there is positive price movement on the previous day according to both measures; 
however, there is no support for opening cross short sales increasing when the overnight price 
change is positive.  We find evidence of a negative relation between short sales in the NASDAQ 
opening cross and price changes for the remainder of the day. 
For our control variables in Table 5 and Table 6, we see that across all models and both 
markets, a stock’s opening trade short volume tends to be positively related to both that stock’s 
previous day’s short selling and previous day’s abnormal return.  These results are consistent 
with previous work concerning daily short sales (e.g. Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009).  
However, we show in Table 5 (Table 6) that firm size and opening trade short volume are 
negatively related (unrelated) on the NYSE (NASDAQ), whereas Diether, Lee, and Werner 
(2009) report that larger firms tend to be easier to short on a daily basis. 
Other results provided in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that across all models and both 
markets, short selling in the opening trade tends to decrease on days when a macroeconomic 
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announcement is made at 8:30 AM, but it tends to increase on days with a 10:00 AM 
macroeconomic announcement.  Also across all models and both markets, short sales tend to 
decrease in the opening trade on the last trading day of a month or quarter.  Because we restrict 
the coefficients of the day of week variables to sum to zero, we interpret our results as averages 
across all days of the week, so we do not report coefficient estimates for these variables.9  The 
Durbin-Watson statistic for the test of autocorrelated errors is presented for each model, and we 
conclude that autocorrelation is not a problem with the models presented in either Table 5 or 
Table 6.  First-order autocorrelation ranges from 3.1% to 3.6% for NYSE observations (Table 5), 
and from 2.1% to 2.2% for NASDAQ observations (Table 6).    
In Table 7 and Table 8, we present results from testing Hypothesis 4 for the NYSE and 
NASDAQ samples, respectively.  We begin by estimating the first model using both 
announcement and non-announcement days to determine if there is any relation between a 
stock’s opening-trade short sales for a day and that day being an earnings announcement day, in 
general, or an NTP earnings announcement day as opposed to non-announcement days.  We find 
that, for both NYSE and NASDAQ, opening trade short volume in a stock increases on days the 
stock has an earnings announcement, with a larger increase occurring if the day is preceded by 
an NTP earnings announcement.   
 In the second model of Tables 7 and 8, we restrict the sample to only announcement days, 
so we remove the announcement day variable from the model but include the surprise from the 
announcement and an interaction variable for the surprise occurring with an NTP announcement.  
The results indicate that NTP earnings announcements are accompanied by increases in opening 
trade short volume on both markets as compared to days when the earnings announcement is 
                                                            
9 We do not report coefficient estimates for day of week variables in any of our results because all models restrict 
these coefficients to sum to zero for interpretation purposes. 
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made during trading.  Earnings announcement surprises are not related to opening trade short 
sales on either market for announcement days, in general, or for NTP announcement days, 
specifically. 
 Next, in the third model, we again use only earnings announcement days from our 
samples.  We use two dummy variables to separately test whether positive or negative earnings 
surprises affect opening trade short volume that follows an NTP announcement.  We also include 
interaction variables for the earnings surprise with each dummy variable denoting whether the 
surprise is positive or negative for NTP announcements.  Surprises may be neither positive nor 
negative, meaning a case of no surprise with an NTP announcement.  The no surprise case is our 
base case for comparison. 
 Results indicate that NYSE stocks (Table 7) with positive earnings surprises have higher 
short volume occurring in the batch open that follows an NTP announcement than on days with 
no NTP earnings surprise, and there is greater short selling in the batch open with a larger 
positive surprise.  However, there is no significant difference between NYSE stocks having 
negative NTP surprises and those with no NTP surprise.  Therefore, in the NYSE sample, we 
find support for our fourth hypothesis concerning positive surprises but not for negative 
surprises.  We find that NASDAQ stocks (Table 8) having either a positive or negative earnings 
surprise have higher levels of short sales in the opening cross following an NTP announcement 
than those stocks with no NTP surprise.  However, the interaction of the direction of surprise 
indicator with the value of the NTP surprise is insignificant.  Therefore, we consider the results 
for NASDAQ stocks to be that short volume in the opening cross following an NTP 
announcement is unrelated to earnings surprises.  We find no support for Hypothesis 4 with the 
NASDAQ sample.  
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 The fourth model in Tables 7 and 8 is estimated using announcement days and combines 
the third model with a variable for announcement surprise value and a variable indicating if the 
announcement is an NTP announcement.  Here, we find that an NYSE stock (Table 7) 
experiences higher levels of short selling in its batch open following a positive NTP earnings 
announcement, and the larger the positive surprise, the higher the short sale volume in the batch 
open.  We also find with this model that NYSE stocks’ batch open short volume is unrelated to 
earnings surprises, in general; to the earnings announcement being made during the non-trading 
period; and to a negative NTP announcement surprise.  Again, these results for the NYSE sample 
support Hypothesis 4 concerning positive NTP earnings announcements, but we find no support 
concerning negative announcements.  Further, results indicate that NASDAQ opening cross short 
volume in a stock (Table 8) is unrelated to any of the variables concerning Hypothesis 4. 
 Results for control variables in the first model of Tables 7 and 8 are identical in direction 
and significance to the results for our models in Tables 5 and 6 (i.e., both NYSE and NASDAQ 
firms).  However, when we study the results for our control variables in the other three models in 
Tables 7 and 8, the estimates for earnings announcement days differ from those for all trading 
days.  We continue to find a positive relation between days with macroeconomic announcements 
at 10:00 AM and short selling in opening trades those days, in both markets.  Additionally, 
NYSE firm size continues to be negatively related to batch open short volume in two of three 
models in Table 7, and NASDAQ firm size is negatively related to stocks’ opening cross short 
volume on earnings announcement days in Table 8.  All other control variables are insignificant 
for estimates using only earnings announcement days. 
 We also report the Durbin-Watson statistic from our tests for autocorrelation in the errors 
of our models and the coefficients of autocorrelation for the models in Tables 7 and 8.  We 
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believe that autocorrelation is not a problem in the first model where it is below three percent in 
both the NYSE and NASDAQ sample.  It ranges from 5.9% in all models tested for the 
NASDAQ sample to 7.0% in one model tested for the NYSE sample when only announcement 
days are included.  Because the announcement days occur quarterly, we do not consider the 
higher values problematic. 
 We present results from tests for a relation between an S&P 500 stock’s opening trade 
short volume on option-expiration Fridays and that stock’s price change between Thursday’s 
close and Friday’s opening trade in Table 9.  We present two different models, each controlling 
for a different measure of price reversal around Friday’s opening trade as in Stoll and Whaley 
(1991).  The first model uses the stock’s price thirty minutes after the markets open on Friday to 
calculate the day’s reversal, and the second uses the close price for Friday in the calculation.  
Results show that opening trade short volume increases dramatically for S&P 500 stocks on 
option-expiration Fridays, and we find that opening trade short volume is positively related to 
overnight price changes, in general, which we previously show in our full sample of NYSE 
firms.  More importantly, the interaction of overnight price change for a stock and the day being 
an option-expiration Friday is positively related to opening trade short volume.  This result 
directly supports our fifth hypothesis that opening trade short sales in S&P 500 stocks are 
increasing in overnight price changes on option-expiration days. 
 Our models in Table 9 show that price reversals around the opening trade are negatively 
related to opening trade short volume for S&P 500 stocks, in general; but on option-expiration 
Fridays, the relation is positive.  This result indicates that short sellers may trade based on known 
reversals for S&P 500 stocks on expiration days.  Other new control variables include the 
put/call ratio and total open interest in options along with interaction variables for put/call ratio 
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and total open interest with an indicator of whether the day is an option-expiration Friday.  
Results indicate that opening trade short selling is less when there is a higher number of puts per 
call, and the relation is more strongly negative on option-expiration Fridays.  These results are 
not consistent with findings that put option trading and daily short selling are positively 
correlated (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009).  The total open interest is unrelated to short volume 
in the opening trade on normal trading days; however on option-expiration days, we find a 
positive relation for total open interest.  These results agree with results from Figlewski and 
Webb (1993) who conclude that traded options facilitate short selling.    
 Results for our standard control variables differ somewhat in this sample, which is 
restricted to only S&P 500 stocks.  Differences include opening trade short volume increasing on 
days when an 8:30 AM macroeconomic announcement is made.  Results from the full sample 
indicate a negative relation with 8:30 AM macroeconomic announcements for both NYSE and 
NASDAQ markets.  Also, we find that a trading day being the last of the quarter is not related to 
opening trade short volume for a stock in the restricted sample.  In the full sample, we find a 
negative relation for this variable on both markets. 
 The errors in the restricted sample of Table 9, show slightly more autocorrelation than the 
full sample.  The restricted sample shows an autocorrelation coefficient of 5.1%.  In the models 
for the full sample, errors show autocorrelation of about 2% for NASDAQ firms and about 3% 
for NYSE firms.  Based on the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.899 in Table 9, we do not consider a 
need to control for autocorrelation in the restricted sample.     
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
 This paper examines how a stock’s short volume in the NYSE batch open or NASDAQ 
opening cross is related to market activity following and preceding the batch open or opening 
cross.  We study the relation of short sales in the opening trade to the level of short sales and 
price changes occurring during the rest of the day, and we investigate the relation of opening 
trade short sales to four different preceding price changes: the overnight price change, the 
previous day’s price change measured from the previous close to close and from the open to 
close, and overnight price changes for S&P 500 stocks related to option-expiration Fridays.  We 
also study preceding activity in the relation of short sales in a stock’s opening trade that follows 
a non-trading period earnings announcement to the earnings surprise in that announcement.  Our 
results differ somewhat between NYSE and NASDAQ markets, depending on the relation tested. 
 We make three conclusions for both NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  First, short volume in 
the batch open and opening cross is positively related to the short volume occurring over the 
remainder of the day.  Second, a stock’s short volume in the batch open and opening cross 
increases when the stock has a positive price change between the open and close on the previous 
day.  These first two conclusions, taken together, are consistent with daily short sales increasing 
on days following positive returns and short selling in the open being predictive of increases in 
short volume over the entire day.  Third, S&P 500 stocks trading on NYSE or NASDAQ have 
more short sales in their opening trade on option-expiration days when the opening price is 
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higher than the previous close.  We suggest that short sellers provide liquidity in the opening 
trade for S&P 500 stocks on expiration days in order to profit from known price reversals. 
 We make other conclusions for NYSE firms alone.  First, batch open short volume not 
only increases for stocks that exhibit positive price changes in the previous day’s open to close 
period but also increases for stocks exhibiting positive overnight price changes.  Perhaps short 
sellers in the batch open consider price changes over the twenty-four hour period from open to 
open as they view pre-market indications of the batch open price.  Second, many firms choose to 
release earnings when markets are closed.  Short selling increases in the batch open on the next 
day for those firms with positive earnings surprises when markets are closed.  However, there is 
no decrease in short selling in the batch open for firms who have earnings releases that reveal 
negative surprises when markets are closed.  These results for earnings surprises during closed 
markets are consistent with informed short sellers acting quickly to trade around informational 
events in order to profit from their superior information.  
 Lastly, we are able to make two conclusions for NASDAQ firms that are not made for 
NYSE firms.  First, short sales in the opening cross for a stock increase when the stock exhibits 
negative price movements during the trading day.  Negative intraday price movements following 
increases in opening cross short volume indicate that short sellers in NASDAQ stocks may be 
able to predict returns during the trading day and not only across trading days.  Second, opening-
cross short volume increases for stocks that have positive price changes on the previous day 
when those changes are measured as close to close or open to close changes.  However, short 
volume does not increase in the opening cross for stocks having positive overnight price 
changes.         
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – NYSE Firms 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Volume in Batch Open 100 11,822,000 23,250.23 5,100 
Short Volume in Batch Open 0 2,113,300 4,471.30 600 
Normalized  Short Volume in Batch Open 0 373.23 1.00 0.27 
Batch Open Time 9:30:00 AM 10:29:46 AM 9:32:02 AM 9:31:21 AM 
First Short Sale Time 9:30:00 AM 4:01:48 PM 9:33:43 AM 9:31:51 AM 
Daily Volume 2,200 338,334,200 1,373,902.19 534,300 
Daily Short Volume 100 45,390,100 231,455.72 101,200 
Daily Volume not in Batch Open (Intraday)  2,100 337,248,600 1,350,651.95 526,100 
Daily Short Volume not in Batch Open(Intraday) 0 45,390,100 226,984.42 99,100 
Batch Open Pricet 5.07 555.50 37.97 34.13 
Close Pricet 5.02 553.86 37.97 34.12 
Close Pricet-1 – Close Pricet-2 -103.47 34.95 0.01 0.00 
Close Pricet-1 – Batch Open Pricet-1 -21.55 32.59 +0.00 0.00 
Overnight Price Chg -103.54 31.76 0.01 0.00 
Intraday Price Chg  -21.55 32.59 -0.00 0.00 
Daily Return -43.48% 52.51% 0.06% 0.00% 
CRSP Equally-weighted Daily Return  -1.82% 2.45% 0.05% 0.12% 
Abnormal Daily Return -43.05% 51.97% 0.01% -0.05% 
Firm Size 83,524,050 459,191,780,240 9,707,849,704 2,547,998,765 
The table presents summary statistics for NYSE firms in our sample used for analysis.  The sample includes 1,072 NYSE common stocks with a CRSP share 
code of 10 or 11 that have at least one trade occurring before 10:30 AM EST on everyday of our sample period of January, 2005, to December, 2006, and that 
have either a batch open or closing price of $5 on each trading day. Normalized Short Volume in Batch Open is a stock’s daily short volume in the batch open 
divided by the stock’s mean short volume in the batch open over the sample period. Overnight Price Chg is calculated as batch open price minus the previous 
day’s close price.  Intraday Price Chg is calculated as the day’s close price minus the batch open price. Daily Return is the CRSP daily return for the stock, and 
Abnormal Daily Return is the CRSP daily return for the stock less the CRSP equally-weighted return for the day.  Firm size is the daily market cap calculated 
from the CRSP shares outstanding value and the close price for the day. For indexing, t is the sample day.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics – NASDAQ Firms 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Volume in Open Cross 1 9,848,167 5,084.11 1,115 
Short Volume in Open Cross 0 3,765,985 1,516.37 100 
Normalized  Short Volume in Open Cross 0 285.96 1.00 0.07 
Open Cross Time 9:30:00 AM 10:29:23 AM 9:30:10 AM 9:30:02 AM 
First Short Sale Time 9:30:00 AM 8:00:00 PM 9:33:04 AM 9:30:04 AM 
Daily Volume 3,140 592,924,962 1,350,610.59 322,566 
Daily Short Volume 100 100,018,527 249,614.11 56,935 
Daily Volume not in Open Cross (Intraday) 2,718 592,918,262 1,345,526.47 319,113 
Daily Short Volume not in Open Cross(Intraday) 0 100,015,427 248,097.68 56,018 
Open Cross Pricet 4.94 153.97 27.11 24.02 
Close Pricet 4.92 154.35 27.13 24.04 
Close Pricet-1 – Close Pricet-2 -71.77 23.83 +0.00 0.00 
Close Pricet-1 – Open Cross Pricet-1 -11.80 10.01 +0.00 0.00 
Overnight Price Chg -72.28 17.64 -0.00 0.00 
Intraday Price Chg -11.80 10.01 +0.00 0.00 
Daily Return -63.46% 48.21% 0.06% 0.00% 
CRSP Equally-weighted Daily Return  -1.82% 2.45% 0.05% 0.12% 
Abnormal Daily Return -64.60% 48.09% +0.00% -0.08% 
Firm Size 64,947,344 299,754,019,840 3,316,326,149 889,186,690 
This table presents summary statistics for NASDAQ firms in our sample used for analysis.  The sample includes 688 NASDAQ common stocks with a CRSP 
share code of 10 or 11 that have at least one trade occurring before 10:30 AM EST on everyday of our sample period of January, 2005, to December, 2006, and 
that have either an opening cross or closing price of $5 on each trading day. Normalized Short Volume in Open cross is a stock’s daily short volume in the 
opening cross divided by the stock’s mean short volume in the opening cross over the sample period. Overnight Price Chg is calculated as opening cross price 
minus the previous day’s close price.  Intraday Price Chg is calculated as the day’s close price minus the opening cross price. Daily Return is the CRSP daily 
return for the stock, and Abnormal Daily Return is the CRSP daily return for the stock less the CRSP equally-weighted return for the day.  Firm size is the daily 
market cap calculated from the CRSP shares outstanding value and the close price for the day. For indexing, t is the sample day.  
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Table 3: Differences in Means between NYSE Batch Open Normalized Short Volume Groups 
 
 
 
Normalized Batch Open 
Short Volume 
 
Means 
 
Group 
Lower  
Bound 
Upper  
Bound 
Observations 
In Group 
 
ISS 
 
OvernightChg 
 
PrevCloClo 
 
PrevOpenClo     
 
IntradayChg 
G1 2<=NOSV  65,922 322,796 0.2281 0.0517 0.0414 0.00413 
0.0102 
-0.0000 
-0.0030 
-0.0053 
G2 1<=NOSV NOSV<2 70,407 276,702 0.0753 0.0128 -0.0001 
G3 .5<=NOSV   NOSV<1 77,075 259,956 0.0221 0.0075 -0.0062 
G4 0<NOSV  NOSV<0.5 141,308 221,030 -0.0350 -0.0104 -0.0180 
G5 NOSV=0 NOSV=0 183,431 164,201 -0.0722 0.0043 0.0017 
         
Difference 
Calculation  
    
Differences in Means 
G1 – G2    46,094*** 0.1527*** 0.0389*** 0.0415*** -0.0061 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.146) 
G2 – G3     16,746*** 0.0533*** 0.0053 0.0062* 0.0102*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.379) (0.099) (0.005) 
G3 – G4    38,927*** 0.0571*** 0.0179*** 0.0118*** 0.0029 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.325) 
G4 – G5    56,829*** 0.0372*** -0.0147*** -0.0197*** 0.0023 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) 
In this table all stock-day observations in the sample are divided into groups based on level of normalized short volume in the batch open.  The normalized 
measure, NOSVi,t , is calculated as a stock’s batch open short volume for a sample day divided by the stock’s mean batch open short volume over the entire 
sample period.  Daily stock observations are divided into groups. G1, G2, and G3 observations have at least twice the normal level, normal level to less than 
twice the normal level, and half the normal level to less than the normal level of short volume in the batch open, respectively, where the normal level is defined 
as normalized batch open short volume of 1.0. G4 observations range from more than zero to less than half the normal level of short volume in the batch open, 
and G5 observations have no short volume in the batch open. For each group, we present the mean value of tested measures in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, and the 
differences in means between the groups.  ISSi,t is daily short sale volume less short sale volume in the batch open, OvernightChgi,t is the batch open price minus 
the previous close price, and IntradayChgi,t is the close price for the trading day minus the batch open price for the trading day.  PrevCloCloi,t is close price 
lagged one day minus close price lagged two days. PrevOpenCloi,t is the previous day’s close price minus open price.  For index purposes, t is the sample day.  P-
values for statistical significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding difference in means. ***, **, or * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively.   
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Table 4: Differences in Means between NASDAQ Opening Cross Normalized Short Volume Groups 
 
 
 
Normalized Batch Open 
Short Volume 
 
Means 
 
Group 
Lower  
Bound 
Upper  
Bound 
Observations 
In Group 
 
ISS 
 
OvernightChg 
 
PrevCloClo 
 
PrevOpenClo 
 
IntradayChg 
         
G1 2<=NOSV  35,430 269,331 0.0260 0.0583 0.0492 -0.0195 
G2 1<=NOSV NOSV<2 28,853 221,774 0.0285 0.0141 0.0125 -0.0081 
G3 .5<=NOSV   NOSV<1 33,762 235,087 0.0291 0.0070 0.0033 -0.0141 
G4 0<NOSV  NOSV<0.5 81,657 381,536 0.0103 -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0050 
G5 NOSV=0 NOSV=0 164,973 184,756 -0.0241 -0.0087 -0.0031 0.0191 
         
Difference 
Calculation 
    
Differences in Means 
G1 – G2    47,557*** -0.0024 0.0442*** 0.0367*** -0.0113** 
     (0.000) (0.6783) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
G2 – G3     -13,313* -0.0006 0.0071 0.0092* 0.0060 
    (-0.066) (0.894) (0.369) (0.067) (0.229) 
G3 – G4    -146,449*** 0.0188*** 0.0076 0.0062 -0.0091** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.108) (0.019) 
G4 – G5    196,780*** 0.0344*** 0.0081** 0.0002 -0.0241*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.949) (0.000) 
In this table all stock-day observations in the sample are divided into groups based on level of normalized short volume in the opening cross.  The normalized 
measure, NOSVi,t , is calculated as a stock’s open cross short volume for a sample day divided by the stock’s mean opening cross short volume over the entire 
sample period.  Daily stock observations are divided into groups.  G1, G2, and G3 observations have at least twice the normal level , normal level to less than 
twice the normal level, and half the normal level to less than the normal level of short volume in the opening cross, respectively, where the normal level is 
defined as normalized opening cross short volume of 1.0. G4 observations range from more than zero to less than half the normal level of short volume in the 
opening cross, and G5 observations have no short volume in the opening cross.  For each group, we present the mean value of tested measures in Hypotheses 1, 
2, and 3, and the differences in means between the groups.  ISSi,t is daily short sale volume less short sale volume in the opening cross, OvernightChgi,t is the 
opening cross price minus the previous close price, and IntradayChgi,t is the close price for the trading day minus the opening cross price for the trading day.  
PrevCloCloi,t is close price lagged one day minus close price lagged two days. PrevOpenCloi,t is the previous day’s close price minus the opening cross price.  
For index purposes, t is the sample day.  P-values for statistical significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding difference in means. ***, **, or 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Regression Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 – NYSE Sample 
 
This table presents regression results for five different models concerning Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  The dependent 
variable in all models is the daily normalized short volume in the batch open, calculated as a stock’s batch open 
short volume for the day divided by the stock’s mean batch open short volume over the entire sample period.  ISSi,t 
is a stock’s sample day short sale volume less short sale volume in the batch open, Overnight Chgi,t is a stock’s 
sample day batch open price minus the previous close price, and Intraday Chgi,t is a stock’s close price for the 
trading day minus the batch open price. SSi,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s short sale volume scaled by 10,000, 
Abdayreti,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s abnormal return calculated as the stock’s previous day’s return  minus the 
CRSP equally-weighted return for the day, and Lnfirmzizei,t is the natural log of the firm’s sample-day market cap.  
Macro 8:30t and Macro 10:00t are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a macroeconomic announcement was 
made at 8:30 AM or 10:00 AM on the trading day, respectively, and zero otherwise.  Qtr Endt and Mo Endt take a 
value of 1 if the sample day is the last trading day of the quarter or month, respectively, and zero otherwise. DW stat 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated to test for autocorrelation in our sample, and p-values for statistical 
significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.4739*** 1.6559*** 1.6558*** 1.6544*** 1.6508*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISSi,t 0.0107***     
 (0.000)     
Overnight Chgi,t  0.4149***    
  (0.000)    
Intraday Chgi,t   0.0327***   
   (0.000)   
Close Pricei,t-1 – Close Pricei,t-2    -0.0007  
    (0.882)  
Close Pricei,t-1 – Batch Open Pricei,t-1     0.0178** 
     (0.021) 
SSi,t-1 -0.0052*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Abdayreti,t-1 3.4108*** 2.9012*** 2.9550*** 2.9598*** 2.4682*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lnfirmsizei,t -0.0759*** -0.358*** -0.0358*** -0.0357*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Macro 8:30t -0.0956*** -0.0993*** -0.0930*** -0.0926*** -0.0928*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Macro 10:00t   1.1479*** 1.1276*** 1.1468*** 1.1473*** 1.1473*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Qtr Endt -0.4736*** -0.4808*** -0.4826*** -0.4864*** -0.4881*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mo Endt -0.2473*** -0.2323*** -0.2385*** -0.2355*** -0.2367*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Adj. R2 0.0377 0.0424 0.0301 0.0300 0.0300 
DW Stat 1.928 1.936 1.937 1.937 1.936 
1st Order AutoCorr 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 – NASDAQ Sample 
 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.9675*** 0.8062*** 0.7860*** 0.8190*** 0.8325*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ISSi,t 0.0010***     
 (0.000)     
Overnight Chgi,t  0.0037    
  (0.762)    
Intraday Chgi,t   -0.1036***   
   (0.000)   
Close Pricei,t-1 - Close Pricei,t-2    0.1202***  
    (0.000)  
Close Pricei,t-1 - Open Cross Pricei,t-1     0.2344*** 
     (0.000) 
SSi,t-1 -0.0006*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Abdayret i,t-1 3.9674*** 3.9571*** 3.9443*** 0.9441** -0.3593 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.426) 
Lnfirmsize i,t -0.0041 0.0039 0.0048 0.0033 0.0029 
 (0.577) (0.595) (0.505) (0.649) (0.693) 
Macro 8:30t -0.2625*** -0.2631*** -0.2624*** -0.2632*** -0.2755*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Macro 10:00t  2.3011*** 2.3067*** 2.3076*** 2.3007*** 2.3020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Qtr Endt -1.0006*** -1.0165*** -1.0283*** -1.0124*** -1.0444*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Mo Endt -0.4301*** -0.4171*** -0.4098*** -0.4345*** -0.4272*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Adj. R2 0.0480 0.0479 0.0481 0.0481 0.0486 
DW Stat 1.956 1.957 1.957 1.956 1.956 
1st Order AutoCorr 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022 
This table presents regression results for five different models concerning Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  The dependent 
variable in all models is the daily normalized short volume in the opening cross calculated as a stock’s opening cross 
short volume for the day divided by the stock’s mean opening cross short volume over the entire sample period.  
ISSi,t is a stock’s sample day short sale volume less short sale volume in the opening cross, Overnight Chgi,t is a 
stock’s sample day opening cross price minus the previous close price, and Intraday Chgi,t is a stock’s close price for 
the trading day minus the opening cross price.  SSi,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s short sale volume scaled by 
10,000, Abdayreti,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s abnormal return calculated as the stock’s previous day’s return  
minus the CRSP equally-weighted return for the day, and Lnfirmzizei,t is the natural log of the firm’s sample-day 
market cap.  Macro 8:30t and Macro 10:00t are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a macroeconomic 
announcement was made at 8:30 AM or 10:00 AM on the trading day, respectively, and zero otherwise.  Qtr Endt 
and Mo Endt take a value of 1 if the sample day is the last trading day of the quarter or month, respectively, and zero 
otherwise. DW stat is the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated to test for autocorrelation in our sample, and p-values 
for statistical significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Regression Results for Overnight Earnings Announcements – NYSE Sample 
 
 Model 
 (1) 
All Trading  
Days 
(2) 
Announcement 
Days 
(3) 
Announcement 
Days 
(4) 
Announcement 
Days 
Intercept 1.5632*** 2.1111 5.1474*** 4.9615*** 
 (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) 
Announce Dayi,t 1.2409***    
 (0.000)    
Overnight Anni,t 1.4096*** 1.4451***  0.5597 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.358) 
Surprisei,t  0.9991  1.0145 
  (0.201)  (0.192) 
Overnight Anni,t * Surprisei,t  -0.8883   
  (0.263)   
ON Posi,t   1.8271*** 1.3819** 
   (0.000) (0.015) 
ON Negi,t   -0.3862 -0.8302 
   (0.143) (0.148) 
ON Posi,t * Surprisei,t   4.3268*** 3.3128*** 
   (0.000) (0.001) 
ON Negi,t * Surprisei,t   0.0212 -0.9933 
   (0.694) (0.203) 
SSi,t-1 0.0024*** -0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.255) (0.677) (0.664) 
Abdayret i,t-1 2.5119*** 0.1302 -3.7131 -3.7491 
 (0.000) (0.975) (0.359) (0.354) 
Lnfirmsizei,t -0.0330*** 0.0042 -0.1298** -0.1265** 
 (0.000) (0.947) (0.040) (0.045) 
Macro 8:30t -0.0816*** -0.1422 -0.1430 -0.1371 
 (0.000) (0.423) (0.413) (0.433) 
Macro 10:00t  1.1079*** 0.5307** 0.5775** 0.5759** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) 
Qtr Endt -0.3898*** 0.9388 1.2454 1.2576 
 (0.000) (0.511) (0.376) (0.371) 
Mo Endt -0.2725*** -0.3520 -0.3344 -0.3336 
 (0.000) (0.344) (0.360) (0.362) 
     
Adj. R2 0.0419 0.0091 0.0420 0.0420 
DW Stat 1.942 1.860 1.877 1.876 
1st Order AutoCorr 0.029 0.070 0.062 0.062 
This table presents regression results for four different models concerning Hypothesis 4. The dependent variable in 
all models is the daily normalized short volume in the batch open calculated as a stock’s batch open short volume 
for the day divided by the stock’s mean batch open short volume over the entire sample period.  Model 1 is 
estimated using all sample day observations whereas models 2, 3, and 4 are estimated using only announcement day 
observations, defined as the actual day an announcement is made during trading or as the next trading day when an 
announcement is made outside of normal trading hours. Announce Dayi,t is equal to 1 when the sample day is the 
day of a firm’s regularly scheduled corporate earnings release and zero otherwise, while Overnight Anni,t takes the 
value of 1 if  a stock’s regularly scheduled earnings release is announced outside of normal trading hours. Surprisei,t 
is calculated as a stock’s actual announced earnings release less the consensus estimate for the announcement. ON 
Posi,t (ON Negi,t) equals 1 when a stock’s overnight announced earnings are higher (lower) than the consensus 
estimate for the stock’s announced earnings. SSi,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s short sale volume scaled by 10,000, 
Abdayreti,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s abnormal return calculated as the stock’s previous day’s return  minus the 
CRSP equally-weighted return for the day, and Lnfirmzizei,t is the natural log of the firm’s sample-day market cap. 
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Macro 8:30t and Macro 10:00t are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a macroeconomic announcement is 
made at 8:30 AM or 10:00 AM on the trading day, respectively, and zero otherwise.  Qtr Endt and Mo Endt take a 
value of 1 if the sample day is the last trading day of the quarter or month, respectively, and zero otherwise. DW stat 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated to test for autocorrelation in our sample, and p-values for statistical 
significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Regression Results for Overnight Earnings Announcements – NASDAQ Sample 
 
   Model 
   (1) 
All Trading 
Days 
(2) 
Announcement 
Days 
(3) 
Announcement 
Days 
(4) 
Announcement 
Days 
Intercept   0.7828*** 4.1423*** 4.2094*** 4.0154*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Announce Dayi,t   0.3331*    
   (0.062)    
Overnight Anni,t   0.8959*** 0.9477***  0.5532 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.231) 
Surprisei,t    0.5445  0.5430 
    (0.644)  (0.645) 
Overnight Anni,t * Surprisei,t    -0.8380   
    (0.536)   
ON Posi,t     0.7564*** 0.3049 
     (0.000) (0.479) 
ON Negi,t     0.9247*** 0.4735 
     (0.000) (0.284) 
ON Posi,t * Surprisei,t     0.7775 0.2310 
     (0.401) (0.878) 
ON Negi,t * Surprisei,t     -1.1285 -1.6749 
     (0.331) (0.312) 
SSi,t-1   0.0002** -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
   (0.039) (0.356) (0.369) (0.357) 
Abdayret i,t-1   3.3137*** -1.7039 -1.4341 -1.5185 
   (0.000) (0.541) (0.607) (0.586) 
Lnfirmsizei,t   0.0046 -0.1373** -0.1359** -0.1312** 
   (0.593) (0.036) (0.038) (0.046) 
Macro 8:30t   -0.2568*** -0.2379 -0.2488 -0.2493 
   (0.000) (0.130) (0.114) (0.113) 
Macro 10:00t    2.2907*** 0.3549* 0.3596* 0.3603* 
   (0.000) (0.099) (0.095) (0.094) 
Qtr Endt   -0.9867*** -2.6664 -2.5549 -2.6073 
   (0.000) (0.141) (0.159) (0.151) 
Mo Endt   -0.4260*** 0.3808 0.4018 0.3947 
   (0.000) (0.257) (0.231) (0.240) 
       
Adj. R2   0.0495 0.0216 0.0218 0.0217 
DW Stat   1.958 1.881 1.881 1.881 
1st Order AutoCorr   0.021 0.059 0.059 0.059 
This table presents regression results for four different models concerning Hypothesis 4.  The dependent variable in 
all models is the daily normalized short volume in the opening cross calculated as a stock’s opening cross short 
volume for the day divided by the stock’s mean opening cross short volume over the entire sample period.  Model 1 
is estimated using all sample day observations whereas models 2, 3, and 4 are estimated using only announcement 
day observations, defined as the actual day an announcement is made during trading or as the next trading day when 
an announcement is made outside of normal trading hours. Announce Dayi,t is equal to 1 when the sample day is the 
day of a firm’s regularly scheduled corporate earnings release and zero otherwise, while Overnight Anni,t takes the 
value of 1 if  a stock’s regularly scheduled earnings release was announced outside of normal trading hours. 
Surprisei,t is calculated as a stock’s actual announced earnings release less the consensus estimate for the 
announcement. ON Posi,t (ON Negi,t) equals 1 when a stock’s overnight announced earnings are higher (lower) than 
the consensus estimate for the stock’s announced earnings. SSi,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s short sale volume 
scaled by 10,000, Abdayreti,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s abnormal return calculated as the stock’s previous day’s 
return  minus the CRSP equally-weighted return for the day, and Lnfirmzizei,t is the natural log of the firm’s sample-
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day market cap. Macro 8:30t and Macro 10:00t are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a macroeconomic 
announcement is made at 8:30 AM or 10:00 AM on the trading day, respectively, and zero otherwise. Qtr Endt and 
Mo Endt take a value of 1 if the sample day is the last trading day of the quarter or month, respectively, and zero 
otherwise. DW stat is the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated to test for autocorrelation in our sample, and p-values 
for statistical significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 9: Regression Results for S&P 500 Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents regression results for two different models concerning Hypothesis 5 that are estimated using a 
subsample containing only firms that are part of the S&P 500 composite index over the entire sample period from 
January, 2005, to December, 2006. The dependent variable in both models is the daily normalized short volume in 
the batch open (opening cross) calculated as a stock’s batch open (opening cross) short volume for the day divided 
by the stock’s mean batch open (opening cross) short volume over the entire sample period. Models 1 and 2 are 
estimated while controlling for a stock’s price reversals around the opening trade calculated using prices 30 minutes 
after the first trade and prices at the close, respectively. OE Dayt equals 1 when the trading day t is an option-
expiration Friday and equals zero, otherwise. Overnight Chgi,t is a stock’s sample day batch open (opening cross) 
 Model 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.2193*** 1.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
OE Dayt 3.8811*** 3.8996*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Overnight Chgi,t 0.2370*** 0.2368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Reversal_Open+30i,t -0.0483***  
 (0.000)  
Reversal_Closei,t  -0.0214*** 
  (0.000) 
Put / Calli,t -0.0011** -0.0011** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Open Interesti,t 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.292) (0.295) 
OE Dayt * Overnight Chgi,t 0.3039*** 0.3013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
OE Dayt * Reversal_Open+30i,t 0.5115***  
 (0.000)  
OE Dayt * Reversal_Closei,t  0.3353*** 
  (0.000) 
OE Dayt * Put / Calli,t -0.0084*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
OE Dayt * Open Interesti,t 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
SSi,t-1 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Abdayret i,t-1 3.1632*** 3.1034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Lnfirmsize i,t -0.0196** -0.0197*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Macro 8:30t 0.0693*** 0.0674*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Macro 10:00t  0.2209*** 0.2283*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Qtr Endt 0.0506 0.0516 
 (0.440) (0.431) 
Mo Endt -0.0683* -0.0698* 
 (0.069) (0.063) 
   
Adj. R2 0.1037 0.1039 
DW Stat 1.899 1.899 
1st Order AutoCorr 0.051 0.051 
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price minus the previous close price. Reversal_Open+30i,t (Reversal_Closei,t) is price reversals calculated as the 
difference between a stock’s price change measured from the batch open / opening cross to 30 minutes after the 
open (closing) and Overnight Chgi,t. Reversals are positive when the movement of the price change after the batch 
open / opening cross is in the opposite direction of the Overnight Chgi,t.  Put / Calli,t is the ratio of put volume to call 
volume for a firm’s options trading on the sample day, and Open Interesti,t is the total open interest in a stock’s 
options trading on the sample day.  SSi,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s short sale volume scaled by 10,000, 
Abdayreti,t-1 is the stock’s previous day’s abnormal return calculated as the stock’s previous day’s return  minus the 
CRSP equally-weighted return for the day, and Lnfirmzizei,t is the natural log of the firm’s sample-day market cap. 
Macro 8:30t and Macro 10:00t are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a macroeconomic announcement is 
made at 8:30 AM or 10:00 AM on the trading day, respectively, and zero otherwise. Qtr Endt and Mo Endt take a 
value of 1 if the sample day is the last trading day of the quarter or month, respectively, and zero otherwise. DW stat 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic calculated to test for autocorrelation in our sample, and p-values for statistical 
significance are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, or * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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ESSAY II: SHORT SALES AROUND OPEN-MARKET REPURCHASE 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
 
   
Open-market repurchase (OMR) programs are the most popular method for firms to 
repurchase stock according to Billett and Xue (2007) and Stephens and Weisbach (2000).  In 
fact, any type of stock repurchase is preferred to dividends as a method for delivering cash into 
the hands of stockholders as Grullon and Michaely (2002) show total repurchase values to be 
113% of dividend values in their sample.  A number of studies document the reaction of stock 
prices to OMR announcements,10 but we consider short sales occurring around these 
announcements to document the trading behavior of short sellers during the days immediately 
following an OMR announcement and to perhaps offer new findings concerning OMR 
announcements. 
Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) consider the quality of OMR announcements as 
indications of inside information.  They highlight the potential for firms to take advantage of the 
normally-positive, OMR announcement effect in order to intentionally mislead investors by 
using an OMR announcement to falsely indicate firm quality.  Chan, et al. (2010) suggest that 
these firms have suspect intent to repurchase stock but show that these OMR-announcing firms 
continue to see increased prices at announcement.  As previous studies view short sellers as 
                                                            
10Examples include Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007); Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004); and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995). 
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informed investors,11 we believe that short volume will increase following OMR announcements 
by firms with limited intentions of repurchasing stock.   
Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) position the announced 
size of an OMR program as a managerial signal of firm quality, saying that larger programs are 
stronger signals of firm quality.  However, Chan, et al. (2010) question the reliability and 
credibility of OMR program size as a signal of firm quality.  Because of the question raised by 
Chan, et al. (2010), we use short sale volume occurring after OMR announcements as a test of 
whether OMR program size serves as a signal of firm quality.  Kadiyala and Vetsuypens (2002) 
suggest that short sales decrease in the positive signaling strength of a corporate event.  
Therefore, we examine short selling in a firm’s stock following an OMR announcement to 
determine whether program size serves as a signal of firm quality. 
One important aspect of studying short sales around OMR announcements is that positive 
abnormal returns tend to occur during OMR announcement periods (Chan, et al., 2010), and Blau 
and Wade (2009) state that it is important to study short selling around positive information 
events in order to have a complete analysis of whether or not short sellers possess superior 
information.  According to Blau and Pinegar (2010), it is an open question of whether short 
sellers are superiorly informed before announcements as they find that short sales are more 
reactive to than predictive of earnings announcements and that short sales do not increase before 
positive or negative earnings announcements.12  
The most common explanation for firms making an OMR announcement is to signal 
undervaluation (e.g., Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).  Further, short sellers tend to be active 
                                                            
11See Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008); Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan 
(2001); and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). 
12 These results are inconsistent with Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) who find short sales to be predictive of 
negative earnings announcements as short volume increases prior to negative announcements being made.  
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when prices are above their fundamental value (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009).  However, we 
believe short sellers are likely to be active in OMR stocks for two reasons.  First, Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel (2004) expect some level of short selling in a stock at any given time and say 
that informed short sales should decrease prior to positive earnings news.  They define positive 
earnings news as announcements resulting in abnormal price increases during the announcement 
period, a description that also applies to OMR announcements (e.g., Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 
2004).  Second, according to Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), firms tend to make 
OMR announcements after periods of poor price performance, and Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh 
(2010) suggest that short selling may be related to stock price momentum as stocks with 
declining values are aggressively shorted.   
The contribution of this study is to document the behavior of short sellers after OMR 
announcements.  We examine short selling following OMR announcements to determine 
whether short sellers are able to distinguish between firms that have suspect intent to repurchase, 
whereas Chan, et al., (2010) find that the market as a whole does not make a distinction between 
these firms and others.  Then, because the question is open as to whether OMR program size 
serves as a signal of firm quality, we examine whether post-announcement short volume is 
related to OMR program size as a test of the signaling power of the announced size.  Lastly, we 
determine whether short sales are predictive of repurchasing behavior following an OMR 
announcement by examining whether post-announcement short sales decrease when firms 
engage in actual repurchases following their OMR announcement.  We study the relation 
between short sales that immediately follow an OMR announcement and the estimated 
repurchases made during the year that follows the announcement.  Firms tend to either complete 
a program or repurchase practically no shares (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998), and the majority 
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of repurchase activity for a firm takes place within one year after the OMR announcement (Chan, 
Ikenberry, and Lee, 2007). 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although an open-market repurchase (OMR) announcement indicates that the board of 
directors gives the firm’s management the permission to repurchase shares, the announcement 
does not serve as a firm commitment to do so (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).  However, 
OMR announcements are generally considered favorable news by investors as Vermaelen (1981) 
suggests that firms use OMRs to signal undervaluation.  According to Dittmar (2000), the 
positive price reaction for a firm’s stock in response to an OMR announcement is partially 
because the market responds to an OMR program as a signal of undervaluation.  Other results 
document OMR announcement-period and post-announcement returns.  Chan, Ikenberry, and 
Lee (2007) report firms that repurchase stock during the first year after their OMR 
announcement outperform matched firms in each of the four years after announcement, but firms 
that do not repurchase stock during the first year show flat returns after the first year.  Chan, 
Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) find abnormal announcement-period returns of 2.2% and excess 
performance of 6.7% (including the announcement effect) in the first year after an OMR 
announcement.  Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) show 2% abnormal returns during the 
announcement period of OMRs.   
Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) state that an interesting question is whether or not 
perceived mispricing related to OMR announcements is due to public or private information, and 
Dittmar (2000) reports that managers engage in stock repurchases because information 
asymmetry between insiders and shareholders results in stocks being incorrectly priced.  
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However, information asymmetry is likely lower between insiders and short sellers than between 
insiders and other public traders as Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) conclude that short 
sellers are informed and rely on private information more heavily than public information to 
make trading decisions.  Chan, et al., (2010) question whether the market distinguishes between 
OMR-announcing firms based on firm earnings quality as measured by discretionary accruals, a 
public information item.  They find that the market response of 2% abnormal returns during the 
OMR announcement period is the same for firms across different levels of earnings quality.  
However, short sellers who possess superior information (e.g., Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 
2004) and who can determine whether managers are falsely signaling with OMR announcements 
should increase short sales when firms use OMRs as false signals.  Oded (2005) shows that firms 
that falsely signal with an OMR bear costs by earning lower post-announcement returns.  
Therefore, by increasing short sales as the market responds positively to OMR announcements 
by false-signal firms, short sellers can profit from the lower future returns of these firms.     
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) argue that the market’s positive response to the 
undervaluation signal of an OMR announcement is related to the announced target ratio because 
it proxies for the signaling strength of management’s inside information.  Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) suggest that the target ratio of an OMR serves as a particularly strong signal versus the 
target ratios of other repurchases methods because the target ratio serves as management’s only 
choice variable in an OMR.  They find that post-announcement returns monotonically increase in 
OMR target ratios.  However, Chan, et al., (2010) argue against OMR program size as a reliable 
and credible signal.  They say some managers not intending to repurchase stock use OMRs to 
mislead investors about the quality of the firm, leaving the target ratio as a questionable signal of 
firm quality.   
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Dittmar (2000) explains that repurchases are a method for a firm to distribute excess cash 
to shareholders when capital exceeds that needed for the firm’s investment opportunities.  She 
says OMRs are preferable to dividends because the firm does not have to commit to the 
repurchase.  Rationally-functioning managers should only repurchase shares if they believe the 
shares are currently undervalued (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).  Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) document that a significant number of 
firms that announce a buyback do not complete the repurchase.  They find that 74%-82% and 
53%-72% of shares, respectively, announced as part of an OMR are subsequently bought back as 
part of the OMR.13  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that firms tend to repurchase either all 
shares targeted in the announcement or practically none.  They find that 24% of firms repurchase 
100% or more of announced shares (complete the program) but that 70% repurchase less than 
20% of announced shares.  Of those firms repurchasing less than 20% of announced shares, 21% 
repurchase less than 5% of announced shares, and 16% repurchase less than 1% of announced 
shares.   
Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007) find that managers have the ability to time the market 
with both the announcement and execution of an OMR, meaning managers may use their OMR 
announcement for its positive price effect and only begin repurchasing stock if the price stays 
below their valuation.  Oded (2005) suggests announcing firms base their decisions to make 
post-announcement repurchases on realized values, so firms that complete an OMR program 
may be those whose stock price remains below managerial valuation after the announcement.  
                                                            
13 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) rely on estimates of the 
aggregate amount of shares repurchased as part of an announced program because the information is not directly 
observable.  Their estimates are reported as lower and upper bounds.  Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) 
report that their 53%-72% result likely underestimates the actual completion rates for announcements in their sample 
period because the last two years of their sample accounted for 35% of the announced shares to be repurchased, and 
they did not track shares repurchased after the end of their sample period.  Therefore, they suggest a better estimate 
would likely agree with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), meaning a 74% - 82% completion rate. 
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Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004) suggest that post-OMR-announcement price drift is contingent 
on whether the stock is actually repurchased, an idea supported by Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee 
(2007) who separate their sample of OMR-announcing firms into three groups according to how 
much outstanding equity the firm repurchases in the year after announcement.  Their sample is 
divided into firms that repurchase no stock, those repurchasing less than 4%, and those 
repurchasing more than 4%.  Their results show that all groups have significant and positive 
abnormal returns in the first year after announcement, but firms repurchasing shares during the 
first year after announcement show continuing positive drift in years two through four after 
announcement.  However, firms repurchasing no stock in the first year do not show significant 
drift after the first year. 
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II. HYPOTHESES 
 
Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) suggest that some managers, experiencing 
pressure to boost stock prices, take advantage of the market’s positive response to OMR 
announcements and announce an OMR program to mislead investors about the quality of the 
firm.  Using a firm’s level of discretionary accruals as a proxy for managerial intent of 
repurchasing, they consider higher levels of discretionary accruals to be an indication of lower 
managerial intent to repurchase shares.14  Chan, et al. (2010) argue that discretionary accruals 
lower earnings quality because discretionary accruals inflate earnings.  They define firms with 
higher levels of discretionary accruals as firms with lower earnings quality, but they find that the 
abnormal return for both groups is about 2% during the OMR announcement period.  However, 
Chan, et al. (2010) find that announcing firms with high levels of discretionary accruals do not 
have long-run positive returns, whereas firms with low levels of discretionary accruals do.   
We examine whether short sellers react to a firm’s OMR announcement according to a 
firm’s discretionary accrual usage.  If discretionary accruals serve as an indication of 
management’s intended purpose for an OMR (Chan, et al., 2010), reactionary short sellers (Blau 
and Pinegar, 2010) should respond to OMR announcements by adjusting their short volume 
according to the firm’s use of discretionary accruals.  Short sales increase due to short-term 
overreaction in prices (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009).  Since Chan, et al. (2010) find that 
                                                            
14 Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010) report that managers have some discretion in the amount of accruals of a 
firm.  They estimate the part of accruals over which managers have discretion and term that part as discretionary 
accruals. 
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OMR announcement period returns are positive for firms with high discretionary accruals but 
that these firms do not show the same long-term positive returns as other OMR-announcing 
firms, short sellers may interpret the positive reaction for high-discretionary-accrual firms as a 
short-term overreaction, resulting in an increase in short volume. 
Our study offers insight into the discussion of whether OMRs serve as tools used to 
mislead investors (e.g., Oded, 2005, and Chan, et al., 2010) as we examine whether short sellers 
react differently to OMRs based on a firm’s discretionary accrual level, which serves as a proxy 
for managerial intent and a measure of firm quality at the time of announcement.  We test the 
relation between a firm’s level of discretionary accruals at the time of an OMR announcement 
and short volume in its stock following the announcement.  If short sellers’ reactions to OMR 
announcements are related to a firm’s discretionary accrual usage, it is an indication that 
informed investors are able to determine whether firm management has limited intentions to 
complete the announced OMR, whereas Chan, et al., (2010) conclude that the market, as a 
whole, does not possess this ability.  We expect to find a positive relation between short sales 
and discretionary accruals used by firms at the time of announcement.  We test the following 
hypothesis: 
H1:  Post-OMR-announcement short volume is positively related to a firm’s level of 
discretionary accruals at the time of the OMR announcement.  
A larger OMR program, indicated by a higher percentage of outstanding shares being 
targeted for repurchase, may or may not serve as a stronger positive signal than a smaller 
program.  Comment and Jarrell (1991) show that abnormal returns after an OMR announcement 
are positively related to the announced target ratio for a repurchase, and they conclude the target 
ratio is a particularly important signal of undervaluation in the context of an OMR because it is 
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the only choice variable to serve as a signal.  Additionally, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) argue 
that the size of the repurchase target proxies for the quality of the announcement’s information 
content and therefore serves as a signal of undervaluation.  According to Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998), larger target ratios serve as stronger signals of firm 
quality, in the context of an OMR.  However, Chan et al., (2010) question the use of OMR 
program size as an indication of managerial information and argue that program size is difficult 
to interpret as a reliable and credible signal. 
Kadiyala and Vetsuypens (2002) advocate the use of decreased short sales following a 
corporate announcement as an indication of the event’s positive signal.  They explain that post-
announcement returns are ambiguous as an indicator of signaling strength when the announced 
behavior increases liquidity.  Price increases following an OMR announcement may be due to 
liquidity effects and not necessarily due to an informational signal.  Cook, Krigman, and Leach 
(2004) find that a firm’s repurchase of shares increases liquidity in the firm’s stock.  Therefore, 
the explanation of Kadiyala and Vetsuypens (2002) indicates positive returns following an OMR 
announcement are ambiguous indicators of whether larger programs are stronger signals.   
Since Chan, et al. (2010) question OMR program size as a reliable and credible signal, 
we examine whether OMR program size is interpreted as a positive signal by examining the 
reaction of short sellers to announced OMR target ratios.  If we find that post-announcement 
short sales do not decrease in program size, then evidence exists that larger target ratios are not 
reliable and credible as stronger positive signals than smaller programs.  This finding would 
support the contention of Chan, et al. (2010) that program size is a questionable signal.  We state 
our hypothesis as follows: 
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H2: Post-OMR-announcement, abnormal short selling does not decrease as OMR program size 
increases. 
OMRs are a means by which undervalued firms stand ready to repurchase shares, but a 
significant number of firms do not complete their announced OMR program because they 
repurchase few or no shares (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000).  Abnormal returns 
are generally positive in the five days surrounding an OMR announcement (e.g., Chan, et al., 
2010), and the market’s reaction to an OMR announcement largely determines whether a firm’s 
stock will actually be repurchased because Oded (2005) indicates that an OMR-announcing firm 
bases its decision to repurchase or not on realized returns, only beginning to repurchase if the 
price remains below inside valuation.  According to Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2009) and Oded 
(2005), OMR-announcing firms that do not subsequently complete their OMR program bear 
costs for non-completion in the form of increased, unwanted scrutiny by investors and lower 
returns, respectively.  These findings are consistent with an undervalued firm announcing an 
OMR, foregoing actual repurchase activity if the market’s reaction to the OMR corrects the 
undervaluation, and suffering lower returns later as it does not complete its repurchase program 
when it does not repurchase shares because it is no longer undervalued.     
Short sellers who have superior information about the true price of a stock (Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel, 2004) have an opportunity to profit by shorting OMR stocks that are 
overvalued after announcement.  An OMR stock that is overvalued following the announcement 
will likely not be repurchased because it is irrational to repurchase a stock that is not undervalued 
(Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996), so the firm is at risk of not completing its repurchase program 
and subsequently earning lower returns.  Firms experiencing lower returns due to non-
completion are likely those firms that limit actual repurchases during the first year after the OMR 
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is announced because Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that firms that complete repurchases 
typically do so within one year of announcement and since Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007) 
show that only firms repurchasing stock during the first year of an OMR program have positive 
long-run abnormal returns.  
OMR stocks that should not be repurchased by the firm because they are not undervalued 
after the OMR announcement are attractive targets to short sellers either because they are 
overvalued or because they will suffer lower returns if they are not subsequently repurchased.  
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) indicate that informed traders will aggressively and rapidly 
trade around information events in order to profit from their information, so we believe that short 
sales will immediately increase following an OMR-announcement that results in an overvalued 
stock.  In turn, this increase in short sales should be predictive of limited repurchasing behavior 
for the firm during the year following the OMR announcement because the stock is overvalued 
after its announcement.  Stocks remaining undervalued after an OMR announcement will likely 
have decreased short volume and will likely be repurchased by the firm because they remain 
undervalued.  In either case, abnormal short selling following an OMR announcement should be 
negatively related to repurchasing activity that follows the announcement.  We state the 
following hypothesis:  
H3: Abnormal short selling immediately after a firm announces an OMR is negatively related to 
the firm’s actual repurchase activity during the year following the OMR announcement. 
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III. SAMPLE FORMATION 
 
Our sample of OMR-announcing firms is taken from the SDC acquisitions database and 
contains firms making announcements from February 14, 2005, through December 19, 2006.  
The original number of firms identified in the SDC database as OMR firms during our sample 
period is 1,214.  We eliminate 337 firms for which we are not able to obtain a measure of the 
number of shares or dollar amount of stock targeted in the OMR, and we exclude 184 firms that 
make more than one OMR announcement during our sample period, attempting to avoid effects 
that may be attributable to a firm making multiple OMR announcements.  These two 
eliminations leave 693 potential firms for our sample.  We take closing price and outstanding 
shares data from CRSP for each trading day from 25 days before the announcement to 2 days 
after the announcement for each of these stocks, and we identify the SIC code and obtain the 
following yearly data items from Compustat: current assets; total assets; cash; current liabilities; 
debt in current liabilities; depreciation and amortization; net property, plant, and equipment; 
sales; and taxes payable.  Short sales are taken from the REG SHO data and are aggregated to the 
daily level so that we obtain an observation for daily short volume for each OMR stock on each 
day during our sample period.  We eliminate OMR-announcing stocks that do not have all data 
items available in CRSP and Compustat, that are not ordinary common shares trading on either 
the NYSE or NASDAQ, that have an announcement-day, CRSP closing price of less than five 
dollars, and that do not have an identifiable daily short volume on each day over the interval of 
10 days before to 5 after the OMR announcement.  These four requirements remove another 279 
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stocks from the sample.  Our final sample consists of 414 OMR-announcing firms.  Of these, 226 
are NYSE stocks and 188 are NASDAQ stocks.15
                                                            
15 The full sample is used for univariate analysis, but the sample tested in most of our regressions has 391 
observations because of missing data for independent variables.  Of these 391 observations, 218 (173) are NYSE 
(NASDAQ) stocks.  
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IV. METHODS 
 
We are partly motivated in our study from previous findings of abnormal returns during 
OMR announcement periods; therefore, we check whether stocks in our sample exhibit positive, 
abnormal holding period returns (AHPRs) during the announcement window.16  We calculate the 
AHPRs for each sample stock during the five-day announcement period surrounding the OMR-
announcement day (t=0).  The AHPR is the holding period return for the stock over the interval 
(t-2, t+2) less the holding period return for the CRSP value-weighted index over the same time.   
Our short selling measure, SS, is calculated as the percentage of outstanding shares sold 
short for each sample stock on each day.  Then we calculate abnormal short selling, ABSS, for 
each stock-day observation by subtracting the median value for SS over the entire sample period 
from the stock-day observation of SS.  The median value of SS serves as our measure of normal 
short selling volume for each sample stock following the trading-pattern approach used by 
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010).  We also calculate a separate measure of abnormal short 
selling, ABSS_weekday, in which we subtract the day-of-the-week median as our measure of 
normal short selling. 
We check our sample for similarity with samples in other studies by two different 
approaches that measure abnormal short selling during the pre-announcement period.  As in Blau 
and Pinegar (2010), we examine changes in the level of abnormal short sales that occur in the 10 
days before the announcement day t.  We do this by comparing the daily mean of abnormal short 
                                                            
16 Since our sample consists of different firms in different time periods than the samples of previous studies, we 
make no direct comparisons between our sample and previous samples.  We only check for similarity.   
61 
 
sales during the interval (t-10, t-6) with the daily mean of abnormal short sales during 5 days, 3 
days, and 1 day before the announcement is made.  As in Christophe, et al. (2004), we then use 
abnormal short sales in the 5 day pre-announcement period as our dependent variable using the 
following OLS regression model: 
ABSS(t-5,t-1)   = α + β1AHPR(t-2,t+2) + β2AHPR(t-25,t-1) +  β3lnPrice(t-5,t-1)  +  ε  (1)  
Model 1 is similar to models in Christophe, et al. (2004) in that our independent variables 
include contemporaneous and future returns, but lagged returns and contemporaneous prices are 
also included in our independent variables.  The dependent variable ABSS(t-5,t-1) is the sum of 
abnormal short selling for each day during the five days prior to the OMR announcement day t.  
AHPR(t-2,t+2) is the abnormal holding period return measured two days before to two days after 
the OMR announcement.  We include lnPrice(t-5,t-1), the natural log of the mean daily close price 
during the five days before announcement to control for abnormal pre-announcement short 
selling related to current price.  AHPR(t-25,t-1), the abnormal holding period return for twenty-five 
days before announcement is included to control for previous and contemporaneous returns 
because Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) explain that stocks experiencing extended periods of 
low returns may be aggressively shorted, and most OMR-announcement stocks have seen recent 
periods of low returns (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009).  
In testing our first hypothesis (H1), we estimate each firm’s discretionary accruals at the 
time of the OMR announcement as a measure of its earnings quality.  Based on the work of 
Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2010), we calculate a firm’s total accruals before the OMR 
announcement by using Compustat annual items for the firm.  The following equation is used for 
the calculation: 
Accruals  =  (∆CA - ∆CASH) - (∆CL - ∆STD - ∆TP) – DEP    (2) 
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∆CA is change in current assets; ∆CASH is change in cash; ∆CL is change in current liabilities;  
∆STD is change in the debt portion of current liabilities; ∆TP is change in taxes payable; and 
DEP is depreciation and amortization expense at the end of the previous year.  The changes are 
measured between the beginning and end of the sample firm’s fiscal year, for the fiscal year 
ending before the OMR announcement is made.    
We are interested in the discretionary component of accruals, which we call discretionary 
accruals (DA), as a proxy for the firm’s earnings quality, as in Chan, et al. (2010).  To estimate 
DA, we first run the following regression model for all NYSE and NASDAQ stocks at the end of 
their fiscal years that occur during the two years of our sample period: 
(Accruals/TA)  =  α0 (1/TA) + α1 (∆Sales/TA) + α2 (PPE/TA) + ε   (3) 
TA is total assets at the end of the fiscal year; ∆Sales is the change in sales over the fiscal year; 
and PPE is net property, plant, and equipment at fiscal-year end.  We separate the NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks by SIC number into the 48 Fama-French industries (Fama and French, 1997) 
and estimate model 3 for each industry.  After estimation, we compute non-discretionary 
accruals and discretionary accruals for our sample firms as follows: 
 NDA = (â0 + â1∆Sales + â2PPE) / TA       (4) 
 DA = (Accruals / TA) – NDA        (5) 
NDA is non-discretionary accruals for each sample firm computed as a fitted value using the 
estimated, industry-specific coefficients from model 3.  DA, our measure of discretionary 
accruals for each sample firm, is calculated as the difference between the firm’s total accruals, 
scaled by its total assets, minus the sample firm’s non-discretionary accruals.   
We also use a relative measure of discretionary accruals in order to control for whether 
our sample stocks’ levels of discretionary accruals are uniformly distributed over DA levels for 
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all NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  Following Chan, et al. (2010), we form quintiles, by sample 
year, of all NYSE and NASDAQ stocks based on their estimated discretionary accruals.  A 
sample firms that is grouped into the quintile with the highest (lowest) levels of discretionary 
accruals among all NYSE and NASDAQ firms for the year is classified as a HDA (LDA) firm as 
a measure of its use of discretionary accruals relative to other firms. 
We use the following OLS model in our regression analysis of H1: 
ABSS(t+1,t+5)   = α  +  β1AHPR(t-2,t+2)  +  β2AHPR(t-25,t-1)  +  β3DA(t=0)    (6) 
+  β4HDA  +  β5LDA  +  β6Earn_Surprise(t=0) + β7Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)     
+ β8 Earn_Surprise(t=0)*Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)  +  ε 
 
The dependent variable ABSS(t+1,t+5) is the sum of daily abnormal short sales occurring over the 
five day, post-OMR-announcement period.  HDA (LDA) takes the value of 1 when the 
announcing stock is part of the highest (lowest) discretionary accrual quintile formed from all 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, and 0 otherwise.  We are particularly interested in the estimates of 
β3, β4, and β5 as tests of the relation between abnormal short selling and an announcing firm’s 
use of discretionary accruals.  We expect β3, the coefficient for the level of discretionary accruals 
of the firm, to be positive since we believe abnormal, post-announcement short sales increase in 
use of discretionary accruals.  We do not have a primary interest in the estimates of the 
coefficients for HDA and LDA, individually, but we are interested in the difference between the 
two coefficients.  We offer no prediction for the sign of β5’s estimate, but we expect it to be less 
than the estimate for β4 because we expect abnormal short selling to be relatively higher for HDA 
firms than for LDA firms.  Even though not related to a stated hypothesis, the estimated 
coefficient for AHPR(t-2,t+2) serves as a test of how short sellers react to OMR announcement-
period returns, in general.  Any prediction for this estimate is ambiguous since Kadiyala and 
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Vetsuypens (2002) indicate a negative relation, but the results of Blau and Pinegar (2010) show 
that short sales increase in reaction to both negative and positive announcements.   
We also control for effects to post-announcement abnormal short selling when an 
earnings announcement is made during the 5-day announcement period of an OMR.  
Earn_Surprise(t=0) is the surprise contained in the most recent regular, quarterly earnings 
announcement occurring as of OMR-announcement day.  The surprise is calculated as actual 
earnings minus the consensus estimate for the announcement, both taken from IBES.  
Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) is equal to 1 if an earnings announcement occurs during the OMR-
announcement interval of (t-2, t+2) and 0 otherwise.  We believe it is important to control for the 
earnings announcement effects because 98 of our 414 sample firms also announce earnings 
during the 5 days surrounding their OMR announcement.  To control for the size of earnings 
surprises made during the OMR announcement window, we include the interaction term between 
the size of the surprise and the variable indicating the announcement is made during the OMR 
announcement window.  
The second hypothesis (H2) deals with the relation of post-announcement, abnormal 
short sales to OMR program size.  As in Comment and Jarrell (1991), we separate our sample 
stocks into three groups based on the announced percentage of outstanding shares targeted by the 
OMR program (also called program size).  The high target group (HTG) contains firms targeting 
more than 10%; the mid target group (MTG) contains firms targeting 5% to 10%; and the low 
target group (LTG) contains firms targeting less than 5%.  To test H2, we use OLS to estimate 
the following regression model: 
ABSS(t+1,t+5)   = α  +  β1AHPR(t-2,t+2)  +  β2AHPR(t-25,t-1)  +  β3Target(t=0)    (7) 
+  β4HTG  +  β5LTG  +  β6Earn_Surprise(t=0) + β7Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)     
+ β8 Earn_Surprise(t=0)*Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)  +  ε 
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In model 7 the dependent variable is our abnormal short sales measure calculated for post-
announcement days 1 through 5.  The variables of interest for H2 are Target, HTG, and LTG.  
Target is the target ratio calculated as the number of shares announced as being potentially 
repurchased during the OMR program divided by the number of outstanding shares at the time of 
announcement.  HTG (LTG) is valued at 1 when the announcing stock is classified in the high 
target group (low target group) based on the firm seeking to repurchase greater than 10% (less 
than 5%) of outstanding shares, and valued at 0 otherwise.  The mid target group, MTG, serves 
as the omitted class such that the group of firms with a repurchase target of 5% - 10% of 
outstanding shares serves as the base case for comparison.  According to H2, abnormal, post-
announcement short selling does not decrease as OMR program size increases.  Therefore, we 
expect the estimate for the coefficient of Target(t=0) to be greater than or equal to zero.  The other 
variables in model 7 are the same as previously described and are included in the regression 
model for the same reasons stated earlier.    
 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that a firm that repurchases stock during the three 
years after its OMR announcement makes the majority of its repurchases during the first year, 
and they find that firms tend to either complete OMR programs by repurchasing at least the 
announced target amount or not complete them by repurchasing less than 5% of the target.  We 
estimate the number of shares repurchased during the first year after announcement by totaling 
the day to day decreases in each firm’s CRSP daily outstanding shares value.  The estimation is 
calculated for the 252 trading days following the OMR announcement, but we delete those days 
whose shares outstanding changed due to splits and stock dividends as indicated by CRSP 
distribution codes.  This estimation process closely follows Stephens and Weisbach (1998), 
except that we use daily observations for decreases in outstanding shares rather than monthly 
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decreases.  From our estimate for actual repurchase activity, we label sample firms repurchasing 
at least 100% (less than 5%) of their targeted amount of shares in the first year as firms that 
complete (do not complete) their OMR program.   
Using an OLS regression model, we test if post-announcement repurchase activity and 
post-announcement abnormal short selling are related using the following model:   
ABSS(t+1,t+5)   = α  +  β1AHPR(t-2,t+2)  +  β2AHPR(t-25,t-1)      (8) 
+  β3Repurchase(t+1,t+252)  +  β4Complete  +  β5NonComplete      
+  β6Earn_Surprise(t=0)  +  β7Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)  
+ β8 Earn_Surprise(t=0)*Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2)  +  ε 
 
We believe that informed short sellers who view the price response to an OMR announcement 
are able to predict the announcing firm’s actual repurchasing behavior because a stock that is 
undervalued (overvalued) after the announcement should be repurchased (not repurchased) by 
the firm (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).  According to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), 
informed traders will quickly trade around information events in order to profit from their 
information, so we believe that short sales will immediately increase (decrease) for stock that is 
overvalued (undervalued) following an OMR announcement.  In model 8, abnormal short sales 
occurring during the first five days following a sample firm’s OMR announcement is the 
dependent variable.  The independent variables used to test our third hypothesis (H3) are 
Repurchase(t+1,t+252) , Complete, and NonComplete.  Repurchase(t+1,t+252) is the proportion of 
announcement-day, CRSP shares outstanding that we estimate to be actually repurchased during 
the 252 trading days following the OMR announcement.  Complete (NonComplete) has a value 
of 1 when the sample firm is part of the completing (non-completing) group of sample firms and  
a value of 0 if not.17   
                                                            
17 We use an independent variable that occurs up to a period of one year in the future, relative to our dependent 
variable, as in Dechow, et al. (2001).  Their model includes the change in the level of short interest as the dependent 
variable and price changes occurring over the next year as an independent variable.  These two variables are 
67 
 
We expect the estimated coefficient for the direct measure of repurchase activity to show 
a negative relation between repurchasing and abnormal short sales in the days following the 
OMR announcement.  Further, we expect completing (non-completing) firms to have lower 
(higher) levels of short selling following an OMR announcement.
                                                                                                                                                                                               
analogous to our use of abnormal short selling as the dependent variable and estimated repurchase activity occurring 
up to one year in the future as an independent variable.   
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We present summary statistics for our sample in Table 1.18  While we do not directly 
compare our sample with previous ones, we find some consistency with prior studies (e.g. Chan, 
et. al, 2004).  Our sample firms experience positive abnormal returns during a 5-day 
announcement window, centered on announcement day.  NYSE firms in our sample experience a 
mean announcement-period AHPR of 0.66%, while NASDAQ firms have a mean AHPR of 
1.27% during the announcement window.  Chan, et al. (2004) find AHPRs of approximately 2% 
during the 5-day announcement period, but they say that these returns are decreasing over time 
as the impact of an OMR announcement is weakening.  Mean target size for OMR programs in 
our sample is 8.09% (8.07%) for NYSE (NASDAQ) firms.  Chan et al., (2004) find mean target 
size to be 6.9%.  Across both NYSE and NASDAQ firms, we find that 26% of our sample 
repurchases at least 100% of targeted shares within one year after the OMR announcement, and 
13%, 4%, and 7% of our sample firms repurchase between 5% and 20%, between 1% and 5%, 
and less than 1% of targeted shares, respectively.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that 24% 
of firms repurchase at least 100% of their announced target, that 11% repurchase between 5% 
and 20% of targeted shares, 5% repurchase between 1% and 5% of targeted shares, and 16% of 
OMR firms repurchase less than 1% of their target in the first year after the OMR announcement 
is made.  In Table 1, we also see that within each market, the results for ABSS and 
ABSS_weekday in the pre- and post-announcement periods are similar.  
                                                            
18 All tables for Essay II are presented in the appendix to Essay II. 
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In Table 2, we present findings for means of and differences in means of abnormal short 
selling during the ten trading days preceding a firm’s OMR announcement.  Here, we see that 
NYSE firms tend to have higher one-day, abnormal short selling, on average, in the 5-day, 3-day, 
and 1-day period before an announcement is made, as opposed to the interval of (t-10, t-6).  The 
difference appears greater one day before the announcement is made.  NASDAQ firms show no 
significant difference in abnormal short selling over the 10 days before an OMR announcement 
is made.  Table 2 presents results for both of our measures of abnormal short selling.  All results 
for differences in means are nearly identical for the two measures.  For the remainder of the tests, 
we use only ABSS as our measure of abnormal short selling.  
In Table 3, we present regression results as we check the relation between abnormal short 
selling in the 5-day period before an OMR announcement and the abnormal returns occurring in 
the 5 days surrounding the announcement.  We find that neither NYSE nor NASDAQ firms have 
announcement period returns that are significantly related to abnormal short selling in the 5 days 
before making an OMR announcement.  This result is consistent with Blau and Pinegar (2010) 
who find that short selling does not increase before positive earnings announcements. 
Table 4 presents OLS regression results and shows that a firm’s level of discretionary 
accruals at the time of its OMR announcement is not related to abnormal short selling that occurs 
in the 5 days after the announcement.  Therefore, our results do not support our first hypothesis 
(H1), which states that post-announcement short selling increases in a firm’s use of discretionary 
accruals at the time of an OMR announcement.  The coefficient estimate for DA(t=0) is 
insignificant in both NYSE and NASDAQ samples.  The variables HDA and LDA are also 
insignificant for both samples, indicating that short sellers do not appear to adjust short selling in 
the tested post-announcement period for NYSE or NASADAQ firms that have discretionary 
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accrual levels in the highest or lowest quintiles formed for all NYSE and NASDAQ firms during 
the year of the sample firm’s OMR announcement.  However, two other independent variables in 
the regression model are significantly related to post-announcement short selling. 
Abnormal short sales in the 5 days following an OMR announcement tend to decrease as 
both NYSE and NASDAQ announcing firms show higher announcement-period returns.  This 
negative relation between post-announcement short sales and announcement-period returns 
indicates that short sellers react to the price response of an OMR announcement, decreasing short 
sales in stocks with positive price moves.  Additionally, abnormal short sales increase in 
earnings-announcement surprises that occur during the 5 day OMR announcement period.  Post-
OMR-announcement short sales are not related to the most recent earnings announcement 
surprise for a firm, in general, and they are not related to whether a firm makes an earnings 
announcement during the same period as the OMR announcement.  The post-announcement 
short sales are related to the surprise contained in an earnings announcement when it is made 
during the same window as the OMR announcement. 
In Table 5, results for NYSE and NASDAQ firms that announce an OMR program are 
consistent with our second hypothesis (H2) that abnormal short selling that occurs during the five 
days following the OMR announcement does not decrease as the amount of shares announced as 
part of the OMR program increases.  Post-announcement, abnormal short selling is not related to 
an NYSE firm’s announced target being in the largest or smallest third of all sample programs.  
We find that short sales in the 5 days following a NASDAQ firm’s OMR announcement are not 
related to whether the OMR program size is part of the highest or lowest third of program sizes 
sampled.  However, the larger the target of the repurchase, the higher the degree of short selling 
occurring in NASDAQ stocks during the post-announcement period.  Kadiyala and Vetsuypens 
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(2002) suggest that short selling should decrease when a positive corporate announcement is 
made, and Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that the size of an OMR program is a positive signal.  
However, Chan, et al. (2010) question OMR program size as a positive signal.  Our work 
supports the contention that larger OMR size announcements are not stronger positive signals 
than smaller size announcements. 
As in the previous model, the results in Table 5 show that post-announcement, abnormal 
short sales for both NYSE and NASDAQ firms are negatively related to announcement-period 
returns and positively related to earnings-announcement surprises that are made specifically 
during the 5-day window surrounding OMR announcements.  We also find, in this model, a 
negative relation between short sales for NYSE firms and their abnormal returns during the 25 
days before the OMR announcement. 
Our third hypothesis (H3) purports that abnormal short sales following an OMR 
announcement should decrease in the actual repurchasing of stock by the firm.  The results we 
present in Table 6 do not support H3.  We find a significant relation between estimated 
repurchase activity in the year following the announcement and short selling in the five days 
after the announcement for NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  However, the sign of the relation is 
opposite of that predicted by H3.  We find that short sales after an OMR announcement increase 
in estimated repurchasing that occurs during the year after the OMR is announced.   
We also test whether post-announcement short sales are related to whether a firm 
completes its repurchase during the first year of its program or whether it is likely not to 
complete its program because it repurchases less than 5% of its target during the first year.  The 
results in Table 6 show that abnormal short selling in the post-announcement period is unrelated 
to whether a firm is a completing or likely to be a non-completing firm, based on first-year 
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estimated repurchases.  We continue to see a negative (positive) relation between post-
announcement short selling and OMR-announcement-period returns (earnings-announcement 
surprises during the OMR announcement window) for NYSE and NASDAQ firms, and we find 
that NYSE firms show a negative relation between short selling after an OMR announcement 
and the abnormal returns the firm experiences in the 25 days before the OMR announcement.  
These two findings are consistent with our Table 5.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
 Our empirical results support only one of our three hypotheses.  Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) present OMR program size as an effective, positive signal; however, Chan, et al. (2010) 
question OMR program size as an effective, credible signal.  Relying on Kadiyala and 
Vetsuypens (2002), we use post-announcement short sales to test our second hypothesis that 
states that there is no decrease in post-announcement abnormal short selling as OMR program 
sizes increase.  Results indicate that there is no relation between OMR program size and post-
announcement short selling for NYSE firms, and NASDAQ firms show higher levels of short 
selling after higher OMR targets are announced.  If larger OMR targets were considered stronger 
positive signals, we would find short sales decreasing after higher targets are announced.  
Therefore, we conclude that OMR program size is not an effective signal for firms to use as short 
sellers do not reduce short sales in response to larger programs. 
We find no evidence that short sellers make trading decisions based on an announcing 
firm’s level of discretionary accruals at the time an OMR is announced as stated in our first 
hypothesis.  Chan, et al. (2010) suggest that firms may use an OMR to falsely signal positive 
news to the market in order to get a short-term price increase.  Their tests show that the market 
response to an OMR announcement is not related to a firm’s level of discretionary accruals, 
meaning firms may be able to mislead investors with an OMR announcement.  If short sellers 
have superior information (e.g., Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004) they should be able to parse 
the differences in high-quality and low-quality firms related to their use of discretionary accruals 
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and adjust their activity following an OMR announcement accordingly.  Our results indicate that 
short sales after an OMR announcement do not change with the announcing firm’s use of 
discretionary accruals, so we conclude that short sellers respond no differently to an OMR-
announcing firm’s accrual quality than the market, in general, and that managers may be able to 
mislead even normally-informed investors by announcing an OMR.  
We also have no findings to support our third hypothesis which suggests that abnormal 
short sales in the days following an OMR announcement are negatively related to the firm’s 
repurchasing activity during the year following the announcement.  However, our results show 
that short sales following an OMR announcement increase in actual repurchase activity for both 
NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  Our third hypothesis indicates that post-announcement short sales 
will increase for firms that do not complete the OMR program as informed short sellers can 
predict repurchasing behavior.  Our results show no relation between short sales following an 
OMR announcement and whether or not a firm completes its OMR program during the first year.  
If short sellers could predict repurchasing behavior, they should decrease short selling for 
repurchasing firms, which are shown to have positive price drift up to three years after the OMR 
announcement (e.g., Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2004).  As a result of our tests, we conclude that 
short sellers are not able to predict the repurchasing behavior of firms that announce an OMR. 
Lastly, our results indicate that short sales in both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks decrease 
following positive, OMR announcement-period returns, but that they increase following positive 
earnings surprises that occur during the same period as the OMR announcement.  Blau and 
Pinegar (2010) show that reactive short sellers increase activity following positive earnings 
announcements.  Our results agree with theirs concerning earnings announcements, but our 
results indicate that short sellers react differently to positive, OMR announcements.  Also, short 
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sellers are shown to be contrarian in contemporaneous returns (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner, 
2009).  However, our results indicate that around OMR announcements, short sales decrease in 
positive returns.  Therefore, we conclude that short sellers may consider open market repurchase 
announcements to be different than other positive corporate announcements. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: NYSE Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
AHPR(t=0)  0.3805 0.5521 -22.2608 10.3109 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) 0.6625 1.1637 -23.4109 12.8881 
Price(t=0) 38.57 34.90 5.57 145.47 
MktCap(t=0) 11,861,174 3,482,550 91,650 214,881,442 
DA(t=0) 0.3100 0.0181 -2.2726 33.4801 
Target(t=0)  8.0891 6.4168 0.1757 51.2325 
Repurchase(t+1,t+252) 5.0606 3.8584 0.0000 36.2102 
Repurchase_Tgt(t+1,t+252) 76.5769 66.2401 0.0000 719.1120 
ABSS(t-5,t-1) 0.2915 0.0717 -0.9505 3.6694 
ABSS_weekday(t-5,t-1) 0.2892 0.0739 -0.9650 3.6425 
ABSS(t+1,t+5) 0.3466 0.1557 -1.1809 7.7573 
ABSS_weekday(t+1,t+5) 0.3447 0.1521 -1.2380 7.7539 
     
Panel B: NASDAQ Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
AHPR(t=0)  0.6858 0.5953 -39.5815 20.3317 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) 1.2664 1.2627 -33.2216 21.5718 
Price(t=0) 24.22 20.42 5.01 128.87 
MktCap(t=0) 5,015,970 642,453 34,651 229,916,700 
DA(t=0) 0.1939 0.0312 -22.8896 13.6919 
Target(t=0)  8.0693 6.6436 1.3152 43.5456 
Repurchase(t+1,t+252) 5.9367 4.0890 0.0000 57.5132 
Repurchase_Tgt(t+1,t+252) 84.7601 52.2639 0.0000 631.5658 
ABSS(t-5,t-1) 0.4983 0.1220 -1.8893 18.7866 
ABSS_weekday(t-5,t-1) 0.4945 0.1227 -1.8827 18.8560 
ABSS(t+1,t+5) 0.7511 0.2461 -2.0237 18.6092 
ABSS_weekday(t+1,t+5) 0.7476 0.2337 -2.0171 18.6006 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample which includes 226 NYSE common stocks and 188 NASDAQ 
common stocks with a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 that made an open-market repurchase announcement during the 
period of Feb. 14, 2005, to December 19, 2006, and that had a closing price of at least $5 on announcement day.  
Panel A includes statistics for NYSE firms in our sample, and Panel B contains the statistics for NASDAQ sample 
firms. AHPR is the percentage abnormal holding period return calculated as the daily return from close to close less 
the same-day return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio; Price is the CRSP closing price for the stock; MktCap is 
calculated by multiplying Price by same-day outstanding shares found in CRSP; DA is the estimated, announcement 
year discretionary accruals scaled by total assets; Target is the proportion of outstanding shares announced as part of 
the repurchase program, reported here as a percent; Repurchase is the estimated proportion of announcement-day 
outstanding shares that are actually repurchased, reported as a percent; Repurchase_Tgt is the estimated proportion 
of targeted shares actually repurchased, reported as a percent; ABSS is abnormal short sales calculated as the 
proportion of daily outstanding shares sold short less the median value of daily outstanding shares sold short for the 
sample period; and ABSS_weekday is a measure of abnormal short sales calculated as ABSS but by subtracting the 
median for the corresponding weekday. For indexing purposes, t=0 is the day of the repurchase announcement.
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Table 2: Mean Short Selling in the Pre-announcement Period 
 
              NYSE            NASDAQ 
       
Day  ABSS ABSS_weekday  ABSS ABSS_weekday 
t-10  0.0493 0.0479  0.0808 0.0787 
t-9  0.0505 0.0495  0.0864 0.0850 
t-8  0.0426 0.0421  0.0980 0.0974 
t-7  0.0358 0.0364  0.0571 0.0584 
t-6  0.0318 0.0319  0.0732 0.0728 
t-5  0.0459 0.0452  0.1017 0.0991 
t-4  0.0578 0.0563  0.0810 0.0804 
t-3  0.0598 0.0593  0.0845 0.0837 
t-2  0.0479 0.0487  0.1337 0.1345 
t-1  0.0801 0.0798  0.0974 0.0968 
       
Difference       
       
(t-10, t-6)  - 
(t-5, t-1)   
 -0.0160* 
(0.099) 
-0.0160* 
(0.099) 
 -0.0210 
(0.394) 
-0.0200 
(0.397) 
       
(t-10, t-6)  - 
(t-3, t-1)   
 -0.0210 
(0.102) 
-0.0210* 
(0.096) 
 -0.0260 
(0.306) 
-.0270 
(0.297) 
       
(t-10, t-6)  -  (t-1)  -0.0380** 
(0.035) 
-0.0380** 
(0.034) 
 -0.0180 
(0.490) 
-0.0180 
(0.483) 
Here we present the mean daily short sales occurring for sample stocks over the interval of (t-10, t-1) where t = 0 is 
the open-market repurchase announcement day. ABSS is abnormal short sales calculated as the proportion of daily 
outstanding shares sold short less the median value of daily outstanding shares sold short for the sample period; and 
ABSS_weekday is another measure of abnormal short sales calculated as ABSS but by subtracting the median for the 
corresponding weekday.  Differences in means are shown as the average abnormal short sales occurring over the (t-
10, t-1) interval minus average abnormal short sales occurring over intervals (t-5, t-1) and (t-3,t-1) and minus the 
abnormal short sales occurring on day t-1. Results for NYSE (N = 226) and NASDAQ (N = 188) firms are presented 
in separate columns. Located in parentheses below each difference in means is the p-value for statistical 
significance. ***, **, or * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Regression Results for Pre-announcement Abnormal Short Selling and Announcement 
Period Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the OLS model, ABSS(t-5,t-1) serves as the dependent variable and is the sum of daily abnormal short selling during 
the 5-day pre-OMR-announcement period. AHPR(t-2, t+2) is the abnormal holding period return during the 5-day 
period centered on announcement day t = 0, AHPR(t-25,t-1) is the abnormal holding period return during the 25 trading 
days occurring before announcement day. lnPrice(t-5,t-1) is the natural log of the mean daily closing price during the 5 
days before the OMR announcement.  Estimated coefficients for our NYSE and NASDAQ sample are listed for the 
tested model with p-values for statistical significance given in parentheses below the estimate. ** or * indicate 
significance at the 5% or 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NYSE NASDAQ 
Intercept -0.0018 -0.0067 
 (0.547) (0.304) 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) -0.0125 -0.0224 
 (0.186) (0.213) 
AHPR(t-25,t-1) -0.0047 -0.0222** 
 (0.260) (0.025) 
lnPrice(t-5,t-1) 0.0014 0.0036* 
 (0.103) (0.081) 
   
Adj. R2                    0.013 0.040 
F Value 2.00 3.59** 
Observations 226 188 
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Table 4: Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the OLS model, ABSS(t+1,t+5) serves as the dependent variable and is the sum of daily abnormal short selling 
during the 5-day, post-OMR-announcement period. AHPR(t-2, t+2) is the abnormal holding period return during the 5-
day period centered on announcement day t = 0, AHPR(t-25,t-1) is the abnormal holding period return during the 25 
trading days occurring before the announcement day. DA(t=0) is the yearly, announcement day estimated 
discretionary accruals, scaled by assets; HDA (LDA) is equal to 1 if DA(t=0) is in the quintile of highest (lowest) 
estimated discretionary accruals formed for all NYSE and NASDAQ stocks in the announcement year and is equal 
to 0, otherwise. Earn_Surprise(t=0) is the surprise contained in the most recent regular, quarterly earnings 
announcement occurring as of announcement day; Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) is equal to 1 if the earnings announcement 
occurs during the OMR-announcement interval of (t-2, t+2) and 0 otherwise.  Estimated coefficients for our NYSE 
and NASDAQ sample are listed for the tested model with p-values for statistical significance given in parentheses 
below the estimate. ***, **, or * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
†We lose eight (fifteen) observations in the regression for our NYSE (NASDAQ) sample due to missing data for 
independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NYSE  NASDAQ 
Intercept 0.0033*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) -0.0562*** -0.0383** 
 (0.000) (0.012) 
AHPR(t-25,t-1) -0.0074 -0.0099 
 (0.109) (0.224) 
DA(t=0) 0.0000 0.0010 
 (0.862) (0.150) 
HDA -0.0020 
(0.175) 
-0.0005 
(0.854) 
LDA 0.0020 
(0.223) 
0.0039 
(0.186) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) 0.0018 0.0035 
 (0.765) (0.779) 
Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0019 0.0017 
 (0.129) (0.491) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) *Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0355*** 0.1921*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) 
   
Adj. R2                    0.162 0.097 
F Value 6.22*** 3.32*** 
Observations† 218 173 
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Table 5: Regression Results for Hypothesis 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the OLS model, ABSS(t+1,t+5) serves as the dependent variable and is the sum of daily abnormal short selling 
during the 5-day post-OMR-announcement period. AHPR(t-2, t+2) is the abnormal holding period return during the 5-
day period centered on announcement day t = 0, AHPR(t-25,t-1) is the abnormal holding period return during the 25 
trading days occurring before announcement day. Target(t=0) is the proportion of announcement-day outstanding 
shares that are target in the repurchase; HTG (LTG) is equal to 1 if Target(t=0) is in the tercile of highest (lowest) 
Target(t=0) for all sample firms and is equal to 0, otherwise.  Earn_Surprise(t=0) is the surprise contained in the most 
recent regular, quarterly earnings announcement occurring as of announcement day; Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) is equal to 1 if 
the earnings announcement occurs during the OMR-announcement interval of (t-2, t+2) and 0 otherwise. Estimated 
coefficients for our NYSE and NASDAQ sample are listed for the tested model with p-values for statistical 
significance given in parentheses below the estimate. ***, **, or * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. 
†We lose eight (fifteen) observations in the regression for our NYSE (NASDAQ) sample due to missing data for 
independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NYSE NASDAQ 
Intercept 0.0033** 0.0012 
 (0.017) (0.645) 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) -0.0551*** -0.0471*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
AHPR(t-25,t-1) -0.0079* -0.0069 
 (0.085) (0.398) 
Target(t=0) 0.0173 0.0478* 
 (0.201) (0.068) 
HTG -0.0024 
(0.139) 
-0.0009 
(0.790) 
LTG -0.0022 
(0.105) 
0.0036 
(0.166) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) 0.0007 0.0085 
 (0.910) (0.497) 
Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0015 0.0025 
 (0.220) (0.311) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) *Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0361*** 0.1469*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
   
Adj. R2                    0.174 0.104 
F Value 6.73*** 3.51*** 
Observations† 218 173 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the OLS model, ABSS(t+1,t+5) serves as the dependent variable and is the sum of daily abnormal short selling 
during the 5-day post-OMR-announcement period.  AHPR(t-2, t+2) is the abnormal holding period return during the 5-
day period centered on announcement day, AHPR(t-25,t-1) is the abnormal holding period return during the 25 trading 
days occurring before announcement day. Repurchase(t+1,t+252) is the estimated proportion of announcement-day, 
outstanding shares that are actually repurchased over the 252 trading days following the OMR announcement; 
Complete (NonComplete) is equal to 1 if the estimated proportion of announced targeted shares is greater than or 
equal to 100% (less than 5%) and is equal to 0, otherwise.  Earn_Surprise(t=0) is the surprise contained in the most 
recent regular, quarterly earnings announcement occurring as of announcement day;  Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) is equal to 1 if 
the earnings announcement occurs during the OMR-announcement interval of (t-2, t+2) and 0 otherwise.  Estimated 
coefficients for our NYSE and NASDAQ sample are listed for the tested model with p-values for statistical 
significance given in parentheses below the estimate. ***, **, or * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. 
†We lose eight (fifteen) observations in the regression for our NYSE (NASDAQ) sample due to missing data for 
independent variables. 
 NYSE  NASDAQ 
Intercept 0.0024***  0.0053*** 
 (0.008)  (0.002) 
AHPR(t-2,t+2) -0.0549***  -0.0414*** 
 (0.000)  (0.007) 
AHPR(t-25,t-1) -0.0083*  -0.0062 
 (0.072)  (0.439) 
Repurchase(t+1,t+252) 0.0210*  0.0341** 
 (0.060)  (0.034) 
Complete -0.0013 
(0.307) 
 -0.0033 
(0.234) 
NonComplete -0.0003 
(0.885) 
 0.0036 
(0.269) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) 0.0043  0.0043 
 (0.480)  (0.726) 
Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0018  0.0019 
 (0.146)  (0.439) 
Earn_Surprise(t=0) *Earn_Ann(t-2,t+2) 0.0327**  0.1789*** 
 (0.015)  (0.001) 
    
Adj. R2                    0.161  0.117 
F Value 6.20***  3.86*** 
Observations† 218  173 
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ESSAY III: PROFIT EFFICIENCY AND BIG BANK PRESENCE IN RURAL MARKETS  
 
 
 
When large banks compete in rural banking markets where one-market banks operate, 
concerns arise for a variety of reasons including how these large banks might affect competition, 
profitability, and profit efficiency within the market.  Pilloff (1999) concludes that big-bank 
presence in rural markets lowers competition within the market since banking operations in those 
markets enjoy higher returns on assets.  In rural markets where one-market banks operate, we 
investigate whether higher returns are due to market power or if big bank presence helps improve 
profit efficiency, and we also examine whether small-market competition from multiple big 
banks changes performance for one-market banks in rural markets.  One important consideration 
in this study is how to define a big bank.  We follow Pilloff (1999) by defining a rural-market 
(non-MSA), big bank to be one of the 25 largest banks the United States, based on total deposits, 
holding at least 10% of a state’s total deposits and operating in a non-MSA county where at least 
one single-market banks operates.   
There are several reasons big banks might want to operate in rural markets.  Perhaps big 
banks operate in small markets because they can compete more efficiently due to economies of 
scale or improved product delivery systems, or big banks may have a presence in small markets 
because there is plenty of profit to be made due to lower competition among banking institutions, 
possibly creating higher loan prices or lower deposit rates in the local market.  In other words, 
we investigate if big banks are maintaining a presence in markets to extract rents or if they 
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compete in markets where they have a competitive advantage due to improved operating 
efficiencies, or both. 
 Previous studies consider the effect of big-bank presence on the profitability of small 
banks operating in the same rural or urban market, but have only examined profit efficiency 
effects of large bank presence in urban markets.  Pilloff (1999) argues that big bank presence 
reduces competition levels, allowing competing banks that operate only in one rural market to 
enjoy higher ROA.  Pilloff concludes that one reason big banks lower competition is there may 
be weak incentives for big banks to aggressively compete in these markets, which suggests they 
may operate at lower efficiency levels in these markets if competing one-market banks are 
operating at lower levels of efficiency.  Hannan and Prager (2009) show similar results in a 
sample of both rural and urban banking markets as they test the effects of large and small, multi-
market bank competition on small, single-market banks.  They demonstrate that the presence of a 
large bank that operates primarily outside a small, single-market bank’s market has a significant 
effect on both the ROA and ROE of small, single-market banks within a rural market, but they 
find no such relation in urban markets, suggesting that big bank presence significantly affects 
profitability of one-market banks only in rural locations.  Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White 
(2009) study both profitability and profit efficiency of small, single market banks as they relate 
to competing bank size and market share in MSA markets and conclude that large, multiple-
market banks compete more efficiently than small, single market banks located in urban markets.   
We extend this previous research by answering the open question of the effect of large 
bank presence on the profit efficiency of rural, one-market banks.  Additionally, our work offers 
insight as to whether large banks operating in these markets compete on efficiency to earn higher 
in-market returns or if they may be earning higher in-market returns without competing through 
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operating efficiency in these markets.  We do not analyze the efficiency of large banks in the 
local market, but we consider the efficiency of the competing small, one-market banks within the 
market as an indication of what level of efficiency is necessary for big banks within the market.  
We focus on profit efficiency of one-market banks in rural markets because banks having 
accounting profitability affected by the presence of large, competing banks (Hannan and Prager, 
2009) may also experience efficiency effects from the presence of a big bank within the market.  
 Our contribution is fourfold:  First, we test whether rural, single-market bank profit 
efficiency is decreased by the presence of one competing large bank.  If the profit efficiency of a 
small bank is lower when a single big bank is present than when there is no large bank operating 
in the same market, then big banks choosing to be in the market may be able to generate 
sufficient returns without having to operate efficiently to do so.  Intuitively, markets where banks 
enjoy market power and rent extraction without highly efficient competitors are where you 
would expect big banks to desire a presence.  Second, we test whether the presence of more than 
one competing big bank has an effect on profit efficiency within rural markets where a one-
market bank operates.  The profit efficiency differences for one-market, rural banks that compete 
against multiple big banks indicate whether the presence of competing big banks induces banks 
in the market to compete on efficiency.  Third, we modify the profit efficiency model and use a 
two-stage Heckman (1979) correction for data selection bias because big banks may choose to 
only be present in those markets having a propensity to be highly profitable.  Previous studies 
finding increased returns for single-market banks in rural markets might not be driven by big 
banks affecting the profitability of the banks within these markets, but by big banks choosing to 
operate in highly profitable rural markets where single-market banks are located.  Pilloff (1999) 
suggests that big banks do not target profitable rural markets but that large bank entry into these 
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markets is normally a byproduct of larger merger activity.  We agree with his assertion and 
suggest that a big bank’s continued presence in a rural market after entry is likely a conscious 
decision made by management.  Therefore, we do not specifically consider why a big bank 
enters a rural market, only that the big bank is present in that market.  Lastly, we examine 
whether higher returns to rural, one-market banks competing against a big bank are the result of 
higher loan income.  Banks with some degree of market power due to lower levels of intra-
market competition may earn higher returns through non-competitive deposit- and loan-related 
rates and fees.  Other studies have investigated deposit-related interest rates (e.g., Hannan and 
Prager, 2004, and Park and Pennacchi, 2009) and fees (e.g., Hannan, 2006) for small banks 
facing big bank competition, so we focus on loan income as the source of higher returns to one-
market banks competing with a big bank in a rural market.  
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW
 
Big banks maintain a presence in rural markets for a variety of reasons.  Here, we review 
the literature for four of those reasons as we consider the effects of big bank presence on the 
competition, profitability, and efficiency of one-market banks operating in rural markets.  Big 
banks may choose to operate in rural markets because of rate-setting advantage from market 
power, unmet demand for lending, above-average returns without competing through efficiency, 
and access to relatively more core deposits. 
Market power exists when banks can charge higher loan prices and offer lower deposit 
rates due to a lack of competition.  Market power studies have conflicting findings about the 
relation between prices and market concentration.  Berger and Hannan (1998) find increased 
market power where banks in more concentrated markets charge higher loan rates and pay lower 
deposit rates.  Conversely, Simons and Stavins (1998) find some deposit rates rose and some fell 
depending on the level of concentration when comparing market prices before and after merger 
activity.  Hannan (1991) finds evidence that market power is very low in a 1984 sample.  
Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997) find little in the way price changes within a market, 
after a merger.   
Santomero (1999) asserts that market power may have declined over time.  The decline in 
market power is likely true because of technological advancements.  Empirical findings on 
market power through deposit and loan prices are mixed with some finding support, such as 
Cyrnak and Hannan (1998), and others finding no support such as Radecki (1998).  Neumark and 
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Sharpe (1992) find market power for deposits where banks in concentrated markets are slower to 
raise deposit rates and quicker to lower them with changes in market interest rates.  In contrast, 
Sapienza (2002) finds that in-market mergers result in a substantial decline in loan rates for 
business borrowers.  
In summary, the results for market power are mixed with some finding market power, 
and others not. The results depend on sample period, whether or not mergers and acquisitions are 
considered, and other measurement issues.  In the case of large bank presence in rural markets, 
these prior results indicate that market power could exist and that big banks desire to maintain a 
presence in those markets with the highest likelihood of market power.  Delis and Tsionas (2009) 
perform a joint estimation of market power and cost efficiency for individual banks and conclude 
there is a negative relation between market power and efficiency.  This finding agrees with our 
conjecture that big banks may maintain a presence in rural markets with a likelihood of market 
power in order to earn higher returns without competing on efficiency.  
Large banks may also maintain a presence in small rural markets due to a lack of 
competition for business lending.  Many studies find evidence that smaller banks tend to make 
more relationship-oriented loans.  If small banks make more of these loans due to less 
competition, this lack of competitors could increase the likelihood that big banks will maintain a 
presence in these markets to lend to customers who have limited access to loans because of fewer 
lenders in the market. Even though big banks are not typically considered small business lenders, 
they are likely to be competitive for small business loans that are more transaction based and do 
not rely on relationships.    
Studies of relationship lending typically investigate small-bank loan quantities and prices 
to small businesses as compared to large-institution lending to small businesses.  Petersen and 
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Rajan (1994) use survey data from the SBA and find multiple bank relationships reduce 
quantities and increase loan prices for borrowers.  Berlin and Mester (1998) hypothesize that 
customers with bank relationships will have loan rates smoothed in response to credit and 
interest rate shocks, but find evidence that banks smooth only in response to interest rate shocks.  
Berlin and Mester’s results indicate banks avoid using market power to extract rents from small 
businesses.  Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) provide theory that multiple banks can 
reduce adverse selection and early project liquidation, and find empirical evidence that better 
economic conditions increase the likelihood of a single lender.  Survey evidence from Cyree and 
Wansley (2009) finds that 85% of bank founders indicate their motivation for starting a bank in 
their market is due to the business market being underserved. Together, these empirical findings 
indicate that big banks are more likely to want a presence in rural markets where fewer 
relationship lenders and competing big banks exist. 
An additional reason for big bank presence in a rural market is to compete with less 
efficient banks in the market.  It follows that big banks are more likely to remain in a market if 
the competitors in that market are comparatively less efficient.  Put another way, big banks are 
likely to find it desirable to operate in a less efficient market because they can still make 
attractive returns with average intra-bank levels of efficiency.   
Pilloff (1999) suggests that big banks are normally present in rural markets due to merger 
activity, so we turn to studies of efficiency after takeovers for possible motivations of a big 
bank’s continued presence in a rural market.  First, we consider studies that show little cost-
efficiency difference after M&A activity.  For example, Berger and Humphrey (1992) find in 
over half of large mergers in the 1980s, the acquirer was more efficient than the target; however, 
cost efficiency improvements were not very successful, on average.  Peristiani (1997) finds 
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acquirers do not improve cost efficiency after a merger for a sample of takeovers from 1980 to 
1990.  Rhoades (1998) investigates nine case studies of mergers involving large banks, most 
occurring in the early 90s, which seemed likely to make efficiency gains and finds that only four 
out of the nine were successful in improving cost efficiency.   
More recently, researchers have focused on profit efficiency since this specification 
allows for inefficiency in both inputs and outputs.  Akhavein et al. (1997) find a 16% increase in 
relative profit efficiency after a merger, largely due to increasing revenues by banks shifting 
output towards loans.  Berger (1998) finds higher profit efficiency after takeovers and that 
improvement is in part due to better risk diversification.  However, Berger et al. (2009) find 
lower profit efficiency for small, single market banks competing against large multiple-market 
banks in urban markets. 
In total, efficiency studies suggest that substantial improvements in efficiency are 
possible, but not likely as banks get larger and expand products into new markets.  While results 
are mixed, they tend to indicate no significant difference in efficiency with increases in size and 
scope regardless of merger activity in the market.  As an extension to big bank presence in rural 
markets, it is unclear that inefficiency would be a main reason for market presence, but 
conventional wisdom suggests that big banks would wish to compete in markets that are less 
efficient so that they are not required to compete on efficiency within the market. 
Big banks may enter rural markets to obtain relatively cheap core deposits.  Core deposits 
are defined as retail deposits consisting of checking, savings, small CDs, and money market 
accounts.  DeLong and DeYoung (2007) find that post-merger banks have improved core 
deposits-to-assets ratios and say that customers providing core deposits are likely to purchase 
additional products from the bank.  Therefore, core deposits not only provide cheaper sources of 
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funds but also likely provide increased revenues from the same customers.  We account for the 
effects of low cost deposits and increased revenue through using profitability measures, which 
include revenue from loans and securities as well as the costs from deposit interest.   
As shown by Cyree (2010), acquiring banks are willing to pay higher prices for banks 
with large amounts of deposits.  Since many big banks enter rural markets through acquisitions, 
it could be the case that big banks desire a presence in these markets to provide access to 
inexpensive sources of funding through core deposits.  Our study looks specifically at big bank 
effects on rural markets.  Big banks that desire funding through core deposits likely find rural 
banks a particularly attractive target since DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) find that core 
deposits account for 67% of total deposits in rural banks and that core depositors are unlikely to 
leave the bank in the short run.   
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II. HYPOTHESES
 
 Pilloff (1999) shows increased profitability for rural, single-market banks when at least 
one big bank is competing within the market.  We test whether our sample confirms previous 
results concerning profitability in order to establish that we have a similar sample and that our 
results generalize.  Our focus, however, is on differences in profit efficiency between rural 
markets where one-market banks compete against big banks and those where they do not.  We 
believe that big banks are likely to operate in rural markets where they can enjoy higher in-
market returns without having to compete on efficiency, which would demonstrate some degree 
of market power.  Not having to compete on efficiency can be demonstrated by relative 
inefficiencies of competing one-market banks.  The results of Berger et al. (2009) show that the 
presence of large, multiple-market banks in urban markets significantly decrease the profit 
efficiency of small, single-market banks operating in the same urban market.  We investigate 
whether or not the same is true in rural markets as we consider the presence of big banks 
affecting the profit efficiency of rural, one-market banks.  Our first hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H1: When a big bank is present in a rural market, banks operating only in that market have 
lower levels of profit efficiency. 
 Pilloff (1999) suggests that big banks may have limited motivation to act aggressively in 
rural markets as they compete against single-market banks, thus lowering intra-market 
competition levels and allowing all banks in the market to earn higher returns.  Pilloff also 
96 
 
concludes that all banks in these markets continue to earn higher returns whether there is one 
competing big bank or multiple big banks.  We hypothesize that if there are multiple big banks in 
the market, big banks are required to compete on efficiency, at least with one another, in order to 
earn higher intra-market returns.  If this is true, then single-market banks would likely operate 
with comparable profit efficiency in order to be competitive with the big banks in the market.  
The result is that rural, single market banks would have less reduction in profit efficiency when 
competing against more than one big bank.  Therefore, we state our second hypothesis as 
follows:    
H2: When multiple big banks are present in a rural market, banks operating in that market have 
higher levels of profit efficiency than when only one big bank is present in the market. 
 Further, we consider whether previous results concerning performance differences of 
small, rural banks are driven by the presence of competing big banks or whether big banks 
exercise choice in maintaining their presence in certain rural markets.  Our market power 
hypothesis predicts that big banks are present in markets where they can be highly profitable 
without having to compete on efficiency.  Previous work with the profitability of rural, one-
market banks has not considered the issue of banks choosing to remain in highly profitable 
markets, so we consider the level and efficiency of rural, small bank profitability as it relates to 
the likelihood that a competing big bank is present in the same market, stating our third 
hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The probability of big bank presence in a rural market is related to the profitability of one-
market banks operating in that market. 
 Lastly, we investigate the source of higher returns to small, rural banks competing against 
big banks.  Pilloff (1999) suggests the higher profitability to small banks competing with big 
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banks in rural markets is due to big banks having limited motivation to compete within the 
market, thus lowering competition and increasing returns.  Returns may be increasing as lower 
levels of intra-market competition endow banks with market power, allowing them to either 
charge higher loan rates and fees, pay (charge) lower (higher) deposit-related rates (fees), or 
both.  Hannan and Prager (2004) and Hannan (2006) document that multimarket banks tend to 
pay lower deposit rates and charge higher deposit-related fees, respectively, than one-market 
banks competing within the same market.  These findings suggest that deposit-related rates and 
fees are not likely the source of higher returns to a rural, one market bank competing with a big 
bank.  To investigate whether loan income offers higher returns, we examine the relation 
between the ratio of interest and fee income from loans to total loans for rural, one-market banks 
and big bank competition in the market.  Park and Pennacchi (2009) indicate that big banks tend 
to set loan rates over a wide geographical area, whereas small banks operating in one market 
likely set rates according to the competitive environment within their market.  Big-bank loan 
rates across many markets that are higher than necessary to compete with one-market banks in 
their respective rural markets may result in rural, one-market banks being able to charge higher 
loan rates when competing with a big bank.  However, Park and Pennacchi (2009) find that as 
big-bank presence increases within a market, intra-market loan rates decrease due to competition, 
suggesting that multiple big banks within the rural market may limit loan-rate profitability.  
Therefore, we also examine the ratio of interest and fee income from loans to total loans and 
whether or not multiple big banks are competing within the market.  We offer the following two 
hypotheses:     
H4: When a big bank is present in a rural market, banks operating only in that market have 
higher levels of loan income. 
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H5: When multiple big banks are present in a rural market, banks operating in that market have 
lower levels of loan income than if they were competing against one big bank. 
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III. DATA AND METHODS
 
Our sample contains individual banks (savings and loan institutions are excluded) that 
operate in one rural county as of June 30 each year according to the Summary of Deposits (SOD) 
and contains information on the individual county in which the sample bank operated.  The 
sample period is 1996 through 2007.  We end our sample period in 2007 to avoid effects of the 
financial crisis beginning after 2007.  Following Pilloff (1999), a sample bank must meet the 
following three criteria: 1) the bank’s offices are located in one county, 2) the county has to be in 
a non-metropolitan statistical area (non MSA), and 3) at least two other banks must operate in 
the same rural county.  This sampling technique results in an unbalanced panel of data since 
banks do not necessarily appear in the sample from year to year. Table 1 presents a breakdown of 
the number of sample banks by year; the unbalanced panel consists of 26,299 observations over 
twelve years, from 1996 through 2007.19  The sample contains a mean of 2,192 sample banks per 
year and shows that banks meeting our sample criteria are decreasing over time. Reasons that a 
bank may not meet sampling criteria include the bank opening offices in another market and 
fewer than three banks operating in its one-county market in a sample year.  We also include an 
indicator variable for whether a big bank operates within the sample bank’s one-county market.  
Based on Pilloff (1999), a big bank meets two criteria: 1) the bank is one of the 25 largest 
banks or bank holding companies in the United States, not including savings and loan 
institutions, as determined by total deposits as of June 30 in each year, and 2) the bank holds at 
                                                            
19 All Tables for Essay III are presented in the appendix to Essay III. 
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least 10% of total deposits in a state.20  For example, if in a sample year, a bank that is one of the 
25 largest banks in the nation holds 12% of total state deposits in Florida and 8% of total state 
deposits in Colorado, the bank is considered a big bank in all counties where it operates within 
Florida in that sample year.   However, the bank is not considered a big bank in any of the 
counties where it operates in Colorado during that sample year.  In Table 1, there are 5,039 
observations in which banks compete with at least one big bank in their markets and a total of 
1,167 observations in which banks have multiple big banks operating in their markets during the 
sample period.  The yearly mean is 420 and 97 sample banks that compete with at least one big 
bank and with more than one big bank, respectively, during each sample year. 
We examine the performance of one-market, rural banks as it relates to competition with 
big banks by using two different performance measures: return on assets (ROA) and profit 
efficiency (PROF_EFF).  Then, we investigate how income from loan rates and fees 
(INT_FEE_INC) of sample banks are related to big bank competition.  Observations for ROA, 
PROF_EFF, and INT_FEE_INC are calculated using information found in each sample bank’s 
fourth-quarter Call Report for each sample year. 
We estimate the efficient profit frontier using all banks for every year, not just rural 
banks, so that each estimate is a proportion of the frontier using all banks and not just those in 
our sample.  We measure profit efficiency as a combination of the model of DeYoung and Hasan 
(1998) and Berger and Mester (1997).  This model is chosen since it allows banks to have 
negative profits and still remain in the sample, which is particularly important in small, rural 
markets where the numbers of competitors are usually low.  The outputs chosen for this method 
allow some power over output quantities rather than the standard output prices.  Profit efficiency 
also allows for inefficiency in outputs and inputs (see Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993). 
                                                            
20 We consider bank holding companies to be banks unless otherwise stated.  
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Our model uses a Fourier-flexible form similar to DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and Berger 
and Mester (1997) and includes trigonometric terms to account for banks that are far from the 
sample means for dependent variables.  This ability is also important for small banks, including 
those competing with big banks in the rural areas contained in our sample.  For input prices, we 
estimate averages across geographic areas in MSAs or rural counties as in DeYoung and Hasan 
(1998).  The outputs for each year vary at the bank-specific level and our estimation for only one 
year avoids the problem of technological change and inter-temporal differences.  The dependent 
variable is operating profit less loan-loss reserves, and we add a constant that varies for each year 
and equals the absolute value of the minimum profit plus one added to each firm so that profit is 
positive.21  There are three outputs at the bank-level: total loans, securities, and fee-based 
financial services measured as non-interest income minus service charges on deposit accounts.22  
The input price vector is measured at the MSA or county level for the cost of borrowed funds, 
the price of physical capital, and the wage rate of labor.  Z is a conditioning vector that includes 
a Herfindahl index for each geographic area, the average non-performing loan ratio in the 
geographic area, and bank-specific equity capital.  The Fourier terms are the trigonometric terms 
that provide a global approximation of the profit function when values of Y are far from the 
sample mean.  The nine X variables are Y, Z, and W variables transformed so they fall on the 
interval of the domain of trigonometric functions.23   
The error terms are separated into two parts as in Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt 
(1982), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and Berger and DeYoung (1997) with u representing profit 
                                                            
21 See Berger and Mester (1997) page 917 for details. 
22 Note that we use securities as an output as in Berger and Mester (1997) rather than transactions deposits as in 
DeYoung and Hasan (1998). 
23 We use the transformation of the variables such that they lie in the interval from [0.1*2π , 0.9*2π ] as in footnote 
three of Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1997).  Also, we use only the transformed variables for the outputs as 
discussed in DeYoung and Hasan (1998) footnote 15 as well as Berger and Mester (1997) footnote 29. 
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inefficiency and v representing a normal random error.  We transform the errors such that the 
inefficiency is stated as a proportion of actual profits as compared to the predicted profits if the 
bank were on the stochastic frontier for a particular year, net of random error, while subtracting 
out the constant in each year as in Berger and Mester (1997): 
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For example, a bank that has profit efficiency of 0.80 is operating at 80 percent efficiency, or 20 
percent inefficiency, for a particular year as compared to the most efficient bank, regardless of 
location.   
For our study, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) correction procedure to control for 
sample selection bias since a competing big bank may choose to only maintain a presence in 
markets that tend to be more profitable.  In the first stage, we use a Probit model to estimate the 
probability that a big bank is present in a sample market.  In the second stage, the inverse Mills 
ratio from the Probit analysis is used to control for the probability that a big bank operates in the 
sample bank’s market.  The following first-stage Probit model is used: 
BIG = f (MKT_ROA, LNPOP, POPGROWTH, HHIADJ, MBB,   (2) 
NUMBER_BANKS) 
  
BIG is a binary dependent variable taking the value of one if a big bank is present in the sample 
bank’s local market and zero otherwise.  MKT_ROA is the mean return on assets of sample banks 
within the market.  LNPOP in the natural log of the population for the county according to US 
Census Bureau estimates.  POPGROWTH is the year-over-year growth rate for the county 
population estimate.  HHIADJ is the adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the local 
market, calculated using percent of county deposits held by each bank as the market share to find 
the HHI, then dividing by 1000 for adjustment.  MBB is a dummy variable equal to one if there is 
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more than one big bank present in the local market and zero otherwise. Lastly, 
NUMBER_BANKS is the total number of banks operating in the market.  We include these 
variables in our model because big banks may only choose to maintain operations in sample 
markets that have more profitable small banks or those that are larger, are experiencing growth, 
are less competitive, are free from other competing large banks, or are markets having fewer 
competing banks.  We also include a series of dummy variables indicating in what sample year 
the observation occurred in order to control for yearly fixed effects.  The Probit model is 
estimated using the yearly dummy variable for 1996 as the omitted group, and so sample year 
1996 serves as the comparison case.   
The regression model used in the second stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure to 
estimate the effect of a competing big bank’s presence on the profitability of sample banks is as 
follows: 
PERF = α + β1BIG + β2LNPOP + β3POPGROWTH + β4HHIADJ    (3) 
+ β5LNASSETS + β6LOANAST + β7MBB + β8NUMBER_BANKS      
+ β9LAMBDA + γQ + ε 
 
The dependent variable PERF is one of our two measures of performance—either ROA, defined 
as the sample bank’s net income for the sample year divided by its reported assets on the fourth-
quarter Call Report; or PROF_EFF, defined as the sample bank’s ratio of profit as compared to 
the best practice bank located on the efficient frontier for the year, given the bank’s inputs and 
outputs.  LNASSETS is the natural log of the sample bank’s reported assets on the fourth-quarter 
Call Report.  To control for risk-levels of sample banks, we use LOANAST which is the ratio of 
total loans to assets.  LAMBDA is the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage Probit model that 
controls for the probability that a big bank operates in a sample market, and epsilon is the error 
term which is assumed to be normally distributed.  All other variables are as defined earlier.  The 
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second-stage regression model is estimated using ordinary least squares, and we include a 
matrix, Q, of yearly dummy variables for year 1996 through 2007 which are used to control for 
yearly fixed effects.  We restrict the OLS model such that the coefficient estimates for the yearly 
dummy variables must sum to zero.  Suits (1984) explains that this restriction over a class of 
dummy variables allows interpretation of estimated coefficients as averages over the class of 
dummy variables instead of relying on an omitted variable to serve as the base case for 
comparison. 
To investigate any effect big bank presence has on loan income to sample banks, we use 
the following second-stage, OLS model: 
INT_FEE_INC = α + β1BIG + β2LNPOP + β3POPGROWTH + β4HHIADJ  (4) 
+ β5LNASSETS + β6LOANAST + β7MBB + β8NUMBER_BANKS     
+ β9LAMBDA + γQ + ε 
 
The dependent variable INT_FEE_INC is interest and fee income from loans from the yearly 
income statement divided by total loans reported on the fourth-quarter Call Report, and it serves 
as our measure of loan income.  All other variables are as previously described.  Again, we 
restrict the model by requiring coefficient estimates for the yearly dummy variables in matrix, Q, 
to sum to zero. 
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IV. RESULTS
 
Table 2 contains summary statistics comparing the means of sample variables for rural 
banks competing with at least one big bank versus those not competing with any big bank.  ROA 
between the groups is virtually identical and the difference between markets with and without a 
competing big bank is not significant.  In contrast to ROA, sample banks located in big-bank 
markets have a mean profit efficiency that is significantly lower than those sample banks in non-
big-bank markets.  Previous research has shown that it is difficult to draw conclusions about 
differences in ROA between bank groups using simple mean analysis, and our results are just as 
problematic.  However, our results for profit efficiency support the hypothesis that banks 
operating in rural markets where big banks choose to operate are not as profit efficient as those 
who do not compete against big banks.  Additionally, the results indicate big banks operating in 
our sample markets may not find it necessary to compete on efficiency since the small bank 
competitors in the market tend to be less efficient in these markets.   
The results from our sample for mean HHI show that non-big-bank markets tend to be 
more concentrated than those without a big bank, whereas as Pilloff (1999) concludes that big-
bank markets tend to be less competitive than non-big-bank markets.  Sample banks competing 
with a big bank earn higher levels of loan income, as hypothesized, and in fact earn lower levels 
of interest and fee income from loans than those not competing with a big bank.  The differences 
in means for the other sample variables are largely as expected.  First, sample banks in big-bank 
markets are significantly larger than those in non-big-bank markets as measured by total assets.  
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Second, big banks operate in markets that are significantly larger in population and have a 
significantly faster population growth than markets without a big bank.  Next, the total number 
of banks located in rural markets where a big bank operates is significantly higher than in non-
big-bank markets.  Lastly, sample banks competing with a big bank lend at a significantly higher 
ratio of total loans-to-assets than do sample banks not competing against a big bank. 
The sample contains a total of 5,039 observations for banks that compete with at least one 
big bank over the sample period and 21,260 observations for sample banks operating in markets 
without a big bank.  Table 3 presents results from the first-stage Probit model and indicates 
factors that affect the probability that a big bank is located in a sample-bank market.  As market 
population increases and as market population grows at a faster rate, there is a significant 
increase in the probability that a big bank will be located in the sample market.  Big banks are 
less likely to operate in markets that have more individual banks since the estimate for the 
NUMBER_BANKS variable is negative and significant; additionally, if one of those individual 
banks located in a sample market is another big bank, it does not affect the probability that a big 
bank will be present in the market as the estimate for multiple big banks in the market is 
insignificant.  
Estimates for market-level ROA indicate that big banks are significantly more likely to be 
located in those markets that are more profitable, an important result since we hypothesize that 
big banks choose to maintain operations in rural markets that are profitable.  However, the 
estimate for HHI shows that big banks are less likely to be in markets that are more concentrated.  
The results for these two variables show mixed support for our market power hypothesis that big 
banks operate in rural markets where profitability is high but that are less competitive, so they 
may have exercisable market power in these markets, and they may not.  We do not present 
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marginal effects for the explanatory variables in the Probit model since they are not necessary for 
our analysis; however, the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage regression is included as the 
independent variable LAMBDA in the second-stage OLS regressions for the dependent variables 
of ROA, PROF_EFF, and INT_FEE_INC in order to control for possible sample selection bias. 
We report the results of the performance regressions to investigate the hypothesis that big 
bank presence is related to differential market performance.  The first column of coefficient 
estimates in Table 4 contains the results for regressions using ROA as the dependent variable.  
Several important results stand out.  First, the variable of most importance to this analysis is the 
BIG indicator for large-bank presence in local markets.  After controlling for the probability that 
a big bank will be present in a sample market, we find that the average ROA for sample banks is 
significantly higher when a big bank is present.  In contrast to previous studies, however, we find 
the effect of multiple big bank presence is significant and negative concerning ROA.  These 
estimates imply that a single big bank operating within the rural market is associated with 
increased profitability as measured by ROA, but as more big banks operate in local markets 
return on assets is lower for sample banks.  Lower ROA for sample banks in markets with 
multiple big banks suggests that when more than one big bank is in a local rural market, the big 
banks choose to compete with one another, thereby increasing competition within the local 
market.  So, any perceived big-bank behavior of extracting rents in local rural markets seems to 
be constrained by the presence of other competing big banks.  The estimate for HHIADJ is 
insignificant indicating that as the local market becomes less competitive, ROA does not 
necessarily increase.  Intuitively, we would expect less competition within the market to result in 
higher returns due to pricing power.  Finally, LAMBDA included from the first-stage is 
significant indicating the control for probability of big bank presence in a sample market is 
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necessary.  In total, coefficient estimates indicate that ROA increases for rural, one market banks 
when a big bank is present in the same market, and higher probabilities of big bank presence are 
associated with higher levels of ROA for competing small banks.  These results are consistent 
with previous findings that higher returns for rural, small banks are associated with those banks 
competing with a large bank, but we also show the necessity of controlling for a big bank’s 
choice to operate in profitable markets.  
Markets with higher populations have a significantly negative effect on ROA while there 
is no significant relation between population growth rate and sample-bank ROA.  The result that 
larger sample banks earn significantly higher returns on their assets agrees with conventional 
banking wisdom that larger banks make more profit.  When a sample bank lends proportionally 
more, returns are significantly higher as shown by the loans-to-assets coefficient.  The number of 
banks within a local rural market is significantly related to ROA. 
Table 4 provides regression results for the model containing PROF_EFF as the 
independent variable.  Focusing on results for the variables BIG and MBB allows insight into 
how big bank presence affects market profit efficiency.  When a big bank is present in a sample 
market, profit efficiency for small banks is significantly lower.  Conversely, multiple big bank 
presence in a market appears to improve efficiency, all else constant, since the estimate for the 
multiple-big-bank variable is significantly positive.  Combined with the results for ROA, these 
results suggest that big banks may be able to extract rents in profitable, rural markets while 
operating relatively inefficient when there is not a competing big bank, but if more than one big 
bank is present, it appears that all banks must compete on efficiency.  Similar to results using 
ROA as the performance measure, LAMBDA from the first-stage Probit model significantly 
affects profit efficiency, indicating that controlling for probability of a competing big-bank is 
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necessary.  A puzzling result is that more concentrated markets have higher levels of profit 
efficiency, which is counter-intuitive as less competitive markets should allow for lower levels of 
intra-market efficiency.  The number of competing banks within the market is associated with 
higher profit efficiency in sample banks, consistent with higher levels of efficiency being 
necessary to compete with a larger number of banks.  
Control variables also provide evidence for the effects of big bank presence on market 
performance.  When profit efficiency is used as the dependent variable in the second-stage OLS 
model, there are some distinct differences when compared to results for ROA.  Markets with 
large populations have significantly higher profit efficiency while a faster growing population 
significantly decreases profit efficiency.  Larger sample banks are associated with lower profit 
efficiency.  However, sample banks lending at a higher loan-to-asset ratios are associated with 
significantly higher levels of profit efficiency, which is consistent with the results for ROA.   
So far, our results indicate that when sample banks compete with one big bank, they are 
able to earn higher returns at lower levels of efficiency, but the presence of more than one big 
bank in the market results in lower returns and higher levels of efficiency for sample banks.  The 
results in Table 4 concerning the independent variable INT_FEE_INC offer some explanation for 
higher returns to small banks competing against one big bank.  The coefficient estimate for big 
bank presence shows that sample banks competing with a big bank have higher loan income in 
the form of interest and fees, but when a small bank competes with multiple big banks, it earns 
lower levels of interest and fee income from loans.  Even though there is an insignificant relation 
between sample-bank ROA and HHIADJ, we find that higher HHIADJ corresponds to sample 
banks earning higher interest and fee income from loans.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that the source for higher returns to small banks in competition with a single big bank is the 
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ability to charge higher loan rates and fees in a market that is less competitive and less efficient.  
However, it appears that when a small bank competes with multiple big banks it earns lower 
returns as it charges lower loan rates and fees in a more efficient market. 
Other results concerning loan income include that sample banks earn more interest and 
fee income from loans in markets with a higher population and those growing at a faster rate.  
However, larger banks, those with higher proportions of lending, and banks with more 
competitors within their market earn less income from loans in the form of interest and fees.  
LAMBA continues to be significantly related to the independent variable, so controlling for 
sample selection bias is an important part of our analysis. 
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V. ROBUSTNESS TESTING
 
For robustness, we again estimate our second-stage regressions to compare markets that 
do not contain a big bank to markets where one big bank is present and, separately, non-big-bank 
markets to those with multiple big banks present.  That is, we use two restricted samples.  The 
first restricted sample includes non-big-bank markets and markets with one big bank, and the 
second restricted sample includes non-big-bank markets and markets with multiple big banks.  In 
Table 5, results for the first restricted sample confirm our previous findings that when a sample 
bank competes with one big bank, the small bank earns higher ROA, performs less efficiently, 
and earns higher loan income from interest and fees.  However, in the restricted sample, sample 
banks exhibit higher ROA in more concentrated markets.  In tests for the whole sample, HHIADJ 
is insignificant, but the result in the restricted sample is intuitive.  We expect banks in more 
concentrated markets to earn higher returns.   
Table 6 indicates that small banks competing with multiple big banks have higher ROA, 
lower profit efficiency, and higher interest and fee income from loans than those sample banks 
competing with no big banks. These results are the same as the results for the whole sample and 
the first restricted sample.  However, the small-bank increase in ROA, decrease in profit 
efficiency, and increase in loan income are smaller in magnitude than those for sample banks 
competing in one-big-bank markets.   
There are other differences in results for the second restricted sample compared to the 
whole sample.  In the second restricted sample, ROA for small banks is unrelated to the total 
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number of banks competing in the market, but profit efficiency for small banks is positively 
related to the total number of banks in the market.  Also, in the second restricted sample, interest 
and fee income from loans is negatively related to the size of the market, measured by 
population.   
In sum, from our robustness tests, it appears that when a sample bank competes with one 
or more big banks, it earns higher ROA, operates less efficiently, and earns more interest and fee 
income from loans.  However, because of the magnitude of the estimates, it appears that sample 
banks competing with multiple big banks have a smaller increase in ROA, a smaller decrease in 
profit efficiency, and a smaller increase in loan income from interest and fees than small banks 
competing with only one big bank.  We verify the smaller magnitudes between market types by 
running our regressions on a third restricted sample that contains only markets where sample 
banks compete against big banks.  
Table 7 gives the results of our regression analysis on the restricted sample comparing 
sample banks competing against one big bank to sample banks competing against multiple big 
banks.  Our previous findings are verified.  In markets where one big bank operates, sample 
banks exhibit higher ROA, less profit efficiency, and higher interest and fee income from loans, 
as compared to markets where sample banks compete against multiple big banks.  LAMBDA 
continues to be a significant variable in all of our robustness tests, verifying the need to control 
for a big bank’s choice to operate in more profitable markets. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of big-bank presence on the performance of banks 
that operate exclusively in one rural market.  Our performance measures include both return on 
assets and profit efficiency.  We confirm previous findings that big-bank presence within a rural 
market has a positive effect on profitability of one-market banks in the same market, but our 
findings also show that when multiple big banks are competing in rural markets, single-market 
banks in the same market have a smaller increase in return on assets than when competing with 
only one big bank.  We also contribute new findings concerning the effect of competing big 
banks on the profit efficiency of rural, single-market banks.  Supporting our first hypothesis, we 
find that when a big bank is present in a rural market, a one-market bank in that market has lower 
levels of profit efficiency.  However, we also find support for our second hypothesis.  When 
multiple big banks are in a rural market, a one-market bank in that market has higher profit 
efficiency than when competing with one big bank.  That is, a one-county bank operates less 
efficiently when competing against at least one big bank, but when competing against more than 
one big bank, there is a smaller decrease in efficiency.  
We hypothesize that big banks have a higher probability of being located in rural markets 
that are more profitable, so we use a two-stage regression model to control for possible selection 
bias, following Heckman (1979).  Results from the first-stage Probit model support our third 
hypotheses.  We find a positive relation between the rural market’s average level of return on 
assets and the probability that a big bank is present in the market.  Results from the second-stage 
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models show that controlling for the probability that a big bank is present in a market is 
necessary.   
Lastly, we find support for our fourth and fifth hypotheses as we try to explain the 
increased returns to small banks competing against a big bank.  Our results indicate that rural, 
one-market banks competing against only one big bank earn more income from loan interest and 
loan fees.  One-market banks competing against more than one big bank also earn higher levels 
of income from loan interest and fees, but the increase is smaller than when the one-market bank 
competes against only one big bank.     
We draw several conclusions from our results.  First, when at least one big bank 
competes in a local rural market, single-market banks in the market earn higher returns that are 
not explained by selection bias, and these returns are not due to increased profit efficiency.  
Higher returns appear to be the result of banks being able to charge higher loan rates and fees in 
a less competitive, less efficient market.  However, the presence of more than one competing big 
bank affects market performance differently.  When more than one big bank competes within a 
rural market, one-market banks competing in the same market operate less efficiently and with 
higher returns.  However, the decrease in efficiency and the increase in returns are both smaller 
in magnitude than when only one big bank operates within the market.  In other words, in 
multiple-big-bank markets, accounting profit is more difficult to obtain, and banks appear to be 
competing on price since interest income from loans and fees also increases by a smaller amount 
than it does in one-big-bank markets.  Probit analysis indicates that big banks are more likely to 
be in more profitable rural markets that contain a one-market bank, and controlling for the 
probability of big-bank presence in the market is important.  
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We consider that the performance of one-market banks in rural markets is an indicator of 
the performance level by competing big banks within the same market.  We conclude that big 
banks choose to maintain a presence in higher-profit markets where they find it unnecessary to 
compete on efficiency to earn higher in-market returns, which suggests some degree of 
exercisable market power.  However, this market power is reduced if there is more than one big 
bank operating in the market because big banks earn lower returns and must operate more 
efficiently.  Implications of this study include that regulators and other stakeholders must use 
caution when one big bank enters a rural banking market as big banks attempt to extract rents 
from these small markets when no other large competitor is present.
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Table 1: Number of Banks in the Sample by Year 
 
Table 1 presents the number of banks in the sample for each year of the sample period 1996 – 2007.  To be included 
as a sample bank, all of the following criteria must be met: 1) the bank must operate exclusively in one county, 2) 
the county in which the bank operates must be a non metropolitan statistical area (non MSA), and 3) there must be at 
least two other banks (whether they are considered big or not) operating in the same county. A big bank is one that 
meets both of the following criteria: 1) one of the 25 largest banking institutions in the United States as measured by 
total deposits in the sample year and 2) holds at least 10% of the deposits within an individual state in the sample 
year. A market is defined as the county in which a sample bank operates. Big-bank (multiple-big-bank) markets 
have at least one (more than one) big bank operating in the market.
Sample Year Number of Banks Big-Bank Markets Multiple-Big-Bank Markets 
1996 3,036 350 67 
1997 2,833 362 47 
1998 2,627 327 67 
1999 2,440 328 66 
2000 2,309 467 78 
2001 2,178 424 83 
2002 2,083 501 123 
2003 1,900 411 121 
2004 1,803 472 125 
2005 1,835 518 151 
2006 1,736 460 127 
2007 1,519 419 112 
    
Total 26,299 5,039 1,167 
    
Yearly Mean 2,192 420 97 
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Table 2: Means and Differences in Means between Market Types 
 Full Sample Big-Bank Markets Non-Big-Bank Markets Difference in Means p-value for Difference 
ROA (%) 1.11 1.11 1.12 -0.01 0.359 
PROF_EFF (%) 53.01 51.54 53.36 -1.82*** 0.000 
ASSETS (1,000) 71,935 87,256 68,304 18,952*** 0.000 
LOAN_AST (%)  57.74 61.00 56.97 4.03*** 0.000 
INT_FEE_LI (%) 8.30 7.99 8.37 -0.38*** 0.000 
POP 28,600 45,212 24,663 20,549*** 0.000 
POPGROWTH (%) .07 0.46 -0.02 0.48*** 0.000 
HHI 2,525 2,201 2,602 -402*** 0.000 
NUMBER_BANKS 7.01 8.33 6.70 1.63*** 0.000 
MKT_ROA (%) 1.12 1.11 1.12 -0.01 0.215 
Table 2 contains means for the entire sample and for individual market types, difference in means calculated as the mean for big-bank markets minus the mean 
for non-big-bank markets, and p-values for significant difference between the means of the two market types. The sample period is 1996 – 2007.  The full sample 
contains 26,299 bank-year observations—5,039 (1,167) are big-bank (multiple-big-bank) market observations.  A big-bank (multiple-big-bank) market has at 
least one (more than one) big bank operating in the market.  Sample bank variables include the following: ROA is yearly net income divided by assets; 
PROF_EFF is yearly profit efficiency; ASSETS is the value of assets on each bank’s fourth quarter call report; LOAN_AST is the ratio of total loans to assets; and 
INT_FEE_LI is the ratio of interest and fee income from loans to total loans.  Market-description variables include the following: POP is the estimated county 
population; POPGROWTH is the calculated yearly population growth rate; HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated using market share as the 
percentage of total deposits a sample bank has for the sample market; NUMBER_BANKS is the number of banks (not offices, but separate FDIC certificate 
numbers) that operate in the local market; and MKT_ROA is the mean ROA for all banks in the local market. *** indicates significant difference in means at the 
1% level for big-bank markets vs. non-big-bank markets.
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Table 3: Results for First-stage Probit Model 
 
Independent Variable: BIG   
Dependent Variables Coefficient Estimate p-value 
Intercept -7.5416*** 0.000 
MKT_ROA 5.5523*** 0.005 
LNPOP 0.6212*** 0.000 
POPGROWTH 4.9239*** 0.000 
HHIADJ -0.0407*** 0.002 
MBB 7.5144 0.996 
NUMBER_BANKS -0.0137*** 0.004 
Y97 0.1229*** 0.010 
Y98 0.0844* 0.086 
Y99 0.1374*** 0.000 
Y00 0.4605*** 0.000 
Y01 0.4364*** 0.000 
Y02 0.5682*** 0.000 
Y03 0.4291*** 0.000 
Y04 0.6060*** 0.000 
Y05 0.6775*** 0.000 
Y06 0.6217*** 0.000 
Y07 0.6531*** 0.000 
Table 3 presents results for the first-stage Probit model.  The sample period is 1996 – 2007. For our 26,299 bank-
year observations, the Probit model estimates the probability that a big bank operates in a sample bank’s county of 
operation in the sample year. BIG is the indicator variable for the presence of a big bank in the sample market, equal 
to one when a big bank is present in the local market and equal to zero when a big bank is not present. LNPOP is the 
natural log of market population; POPGROWTH is the calculated yearly population growth rate; HHIADJ is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market divided by 1000; MBB is an indicator equal to one if there is more than 
one big bank in the market and zero otherwise; NUMBER_BANKS is the total number of banks operating in the 
market; Y97 – Y07 are dummy variables indicating the sample year, used to control for yearly fixed effects with 
1996 serving as the omitted year. * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Results for Second-stage OLS Models 
 
                   Independent Variables 
               ROA      PROF_EFF    INT_FEE_INC 
 
Dependent Variables 
                  Coefficient Estimate 
                  (p-value) 
Intercept -0.0091*** 
(0.000) 
0.3734*** 
(0.000) 
0.1268*** 
(0.000) 
BIG 0.0079*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0605*** 
(0.000) 
0.0104*** 
(0.000) 
LNPOP -0.0019*** 
(0.000) 
0.0169*** 
(0.000) 
0.0004* 
(0.084) 
POPGROWTH -0.0001 
(0.969) 
-0.1901*** 
(0.002) 
0.0348*** 
(0.000) 
HHIADJ 0.0001 
(0.112) 
0.0045*** 
(0.000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.000) 
LNASSETS 0.0020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.000) 
LOANAST 0.0016*** 
(0.000) 
0.0983*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0089*** 
(0.000) 
MBB -0.0063*** 
(0.000) 
0.0328*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0081*** 
(0.000) 
NUMBER_BANKS 0.0001*** 
(0.002) 
0.0005 
(0.214) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.000) 
LAMDA  -0.0044*** 
(0.000) 
0.0329*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.000) 
    
Adjusted R2                 0.058 0.451 0.333 
Table 4 presents results for three separate, second-stage OLS models with ROA, PROF_EFF, or INT_FEE_INC 
serving as the independent variable.  The sample period is 1996 – 2007. ROA is return on assets, calculated as yearly 
net income from the income statement divided by the firm’s assets reported on the fourth quarter balance sheet.  
PROF_EFF is a bank’s yearly profit efficiency, calculated relation to the year’s best practice bank having a profit 
efficiency of 1 or 100%.  INT_FEE_INC is our measure of loan income, calculated as the ratio of the bank’s yearly 
interest and fee income from loans to the bank’s total loans from the fourth quarter call report. BIG is an indicator 
variable for the presence of a big bank in the sample bank’s one-county market; LNPOP is the natural log of market 
population; POPGROWTH is the market’s calculated yearly population growth rate; HHIADJ is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the market divided by 1000; LNASSETS is the natural log of a sample bank’s asset value 
reported on the fourth quarter call report; LOANAST is a sample bank’s yearly ratio of total loans to assets; MBB is 
an indicator equal to one if there is more than one big bank in the market and zero otherwise; NUMBER_BANKS is 
the number of banks operating in the market; and LAMDA is the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage Probit 
model. Yearly dummy variables were included to control for yearly fixed effects and are not reported because we 
restricted the model so that coefficient estimates for these variables must sum to one. The sample tested has a total 
of 26,299 observations, consisting of 5,039 observations for sample banks in markets with at least one big bank 
(1,167 have more than one big bank) and 21,260 observations for sample banks in markets without a big bank 
present. * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively, and p-values are provided in 
parentheses below corresponding coefficient estimates.
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Table 5: Robustness Results for One-big-bank Markets versus Non-big-bank Markets 
 
                     Independent Variables 
                   ROA   PROF_EFF INT_FEE_INC 
 
Dependent Variables 
                   Coefficient Estimate 
                   (p-value) 
Intercept -0.0085*** 
(0.000) 
0.3880*** 
(0.000) 
0.1249*** 
(0.000) 
BIG 0.0074*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0601*** 
(0.000) 
0.0086*** 
(0.000) 
LNPOP -0.0018*** 
(0.000) 
0.0160*** 
(0.000) 
0.0007*** 
(0.003) 
POPGROWTH 0.0005 
(0.890) 
-0.1690*** 
(0.008) 
0.0400*** 
(0.000) 
HHIADJ 0.0001* 
(0.056) 
0.0046*** 
(0.000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.000) 
LNASSETS 0.0019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0051*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.000) 
LOANAST 0.0018*** 
(0.000) 
0.0970*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0085*** 
(0.000) 
NUMBER_BANKS 0.0001*** 
(0.010) 
0.0008** 
(0.037) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.000) 
LAMDA -0.0042*** 
(0.000) 
0.0327*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.000) 
    
Adjusted R2                0.054 0.451 0.326 
Table 5 presents results for three separate, second-stage OLS models with ROA, PROF_EFF, or INT_FEE_INC 
serving as the independent variable.  The sample period is 1996 – 2007. ROA is return on assets, calculated as yearly 
net income from the income statement divided by the firm’s assets reported on the fourth quarter balance sheet.  
PROF_EFF is a bank’s yearly profit efficiency, calculated relation to the year’s best practice bank having a profit 
efficiency of 1 or 100%.  INT_FEE_INC is our measure of loan income, calculated as the ratio of the bank’s yearly 
interest and fee income from loans to the bank’s total loans from the fourth quarter call report. BIG is an indicator 
variable for the presence of a big bank in the sample bank’s one-county market; LNPOP is the natural log of market 
population; POPGROWTH is the market’s calculated yearly population growth rate; HHIADJ is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the market divided by 1000; LNASSETS is the natural log of a sample bank’s asset value 
reported on the fourth quarter call report; LOANAST is a sample bank’s yearly ratio of total loans to assets; 
NUMBER_BANKS is the number of banks operating in the market; and LAMDA is the inverse Mills ratio from the 
first-stage Probit model. Yearly dummy variables were included to control for yearly fixed effects and are not 
reported because we restricted the model so that coefficient estimates for these variables must sum to one. The 
sample tested has a total of 25,132 observations, consisting of 3,872 observations for sample banks in markets with 
one big bank 21,260 observations for sample banks in markets without a big bank present. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and p-values are provided in parentheses below 
corresponding coefficient estimates.
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Table 6: Robustness Results for Multiple-big-bank Markets versus Non-big-bank Markets 
 
                  Independent Variables 
                    ROA      PROF_EFF INT_FEE_INC 
 
Dependent Variables 
                 Coefficient Estimate 
                  (p-value) 
Intercept 0.0002 
(0.912) 
0.2902*** 
(0.000) 
0.1409*** 
(0.000) 
MBB 0.0049*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0546*** 
(0.000) 
0.0065*** 
(0.000) 
LNPOP -0.0030*** 
(0.000) 
0.0246*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.008) 
POPGROWTH -0.0016 
(0.702) 
-0.1605** 
(0.017) 
0.0273*** 
(0.000) 
HHIADJ 0.0001 
(0.103) 
0.0060*** 
(0.000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.000) 
LNASSETS 0.0020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.000) 
LOANAST 0.0021*** 
(0.000) 
0.0999*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0095*** 
(0.000) 
NUMBER_BANKS 0.0000 
(0.191) 
0.0015*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.000) 
LAMDA -0.0119*** 
(0.000) 
0.0917*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0146*** 
(0.000) 
    
Adjusted R2                 0.067 0.452 0.379 
Table 6 presents results for three separate, second-stage OLS models with ROA, PROF_EFF, or INT_FEE_INC 
serving as the independent variable.  The sample period is 1996 – 2007. ROA is return on assets, calculated as yearly 
net income from the income statement divided by the firm’s assets reported on the fourth quarter balance sheet.  
PROF_EFF is a bank’s yearly profit efficiency, calculated relation to the year’s best practice bank having a profit 
efficiency of 1 or 100%.  INT_FEE_INC is our measure of loan income, calculated as the ratio of the bank’s yearly 
interest and fee income from loans to the bank’s total loans from the fourth quarter call report. MBB is an indicator 
equal to one if there is more than one big bank in the sample market and zero otherwise; LNPOP is the natural log of 
market population; POPGROWTH is the market’s calculated yearly population growth rate; HHIADJ is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market divided by 1000; LNASSETS is the natural log of a sample bank’s asset 
value reported on the fourth quarter call report; LOANAST is a sample bank’s yearly ratio of total loans to assets; 
NUMBER_BANKS is the number of banks operating in the market; and LAMDA is the inverse Mills ratio from the 
first-stage Probit model. Yearly dummy variables were included to control for yearly fixed effects and are not 
reported because we restricted the model so that coefficient estimates for these variables must sum to one. The 
sample tested has a total of 22,427 observations, consisting of 1,167 observations for sample banks in markets with 
multiple big banks and 21,260 observations for sample banks in markets without a big bank present.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and p-values are provided in parentheses below 
corresponding coefficient estimates.
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Table 7: Robustness Results for One-big-bank Markets versus Multiple-big-bank Markets 
 
                 Independent Variables 
                           ROA        PROF_EFF INT_FEE_INC 
 
Dependent Variables 
                Coefficient Estimate 
                  (p-value) 
Intercept 0.0199*** 
(0.000) 
0.1226* 
(0.070) 
0.1590*** 
(0.000) 
ONE_BIG 0.0100*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.000) 
0.0139*** 
(0.000) 
LNPOP -0.0057*** 
(0.000) 
0.0420*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.000) 
POPGROWTH -0.0428*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0258 
(0.862) 
-0.0119 
(0.610) 
HHIADJ 0.0002 
(0.264) 
0.0004 
(0.828) 
0.0004 
(0.213) 
LNASSETS 0.0028*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0053** 
(0.013) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.001) 
LOANAST -0.0016** 
(0.039) 
0.1019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.000) 
NUMBER_BANKS 0.0003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.003) 
LAMDA -0.0086*** 
(0.000) 
0.0546*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0116*** 
(0.000) 
    
Adjusted R2                  0.087 0.458 0.231 
Table 7 presents results for three separate, second-stage OLS models with ROA, PROF_EFF, or INT_FEE_INC 
serving as the independent variable. The sample period is 1996 – 2007. ROA is return on assets, calculated as yearly 
net income from the income statement divided by the firm’s assets reported on the fourth quarter balance sheet.  
PROF_EFF is a bank’s yearly profit efficiency, calculated relation to the year’s best practice bank having a profit 
efficiency of 1 or 100%.  INT_FEE_INC is our measure of loan income, calculated as the ratio of the bank’s yearly 
interest and fee income from loans to the bank’s total loans from the fourth quarter call report. ONE_BIG is an 
indicator variable, equaling one when one big bank is present in a sample bank’s one-county market and zero 
otherwise; LNPOP is the natural log of market population; POPGROWTH is the market’s calculated yearly 
population growth rate; HHIADJ is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market divided by 1000; LNASSETS is 
the natural log of a sample bank’s asset value reported on the fourth quarter call report; LOANAST is a sample 
bank’s yearly ratio of total loans to assets; NUMBER_BANKS is the number of banks operating in the market; and 
LAMDA is the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage Probit model. Yearly dummy variables were included to 
control for yearly fixed effects and are not reported because we restricted the model so that coefficient estimates for 
these variables must sum to one. The sample tested has a total of 5,039 observations, consisting of 3,872 
observations for sample banks in markets where one big bank is present and 1,167 observations for sample banks in 
markets with multiple big banks.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
and p-values are provided in parentheses below corresponding coefficient estimates.
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